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I. INTRODUCTION: PROTECTING THE INDIVIDUAL OR THE GROUP? 
American jurisprudence is frequently criticized for its preoccupation 
with rights and for what one commentator, Mary Ann Glendon, calls its 
"legalistic character, its exaggerated absoluteness, its 
hyperindividualism, its insularity, and its silence with respect to 
personal, civic, and collective responsibilities."' American law is 
condemned for its anti-social nature. Or, to put it another way, the 
American legal system is known for protecting the individual and not the 
group. 
The Supreme Court, as the supreme expositor of American law, takes 
the lion's share of the blame for this tendency. Legal scholars T.A. 
Aleinikoff and Samuel Issacharoff, in their assessment of the 
controversial decision in Shaw v. Reno,' offer a representative criticism 
I. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE, at x (1991). The emphasis on individualism is widely supposed to derive 
from the myth of the independent yeoman. Thus, J.G.A. Pocock, whom Glendon cites in 
this regard, asserts that "[t]he point about freehold in this context is that it involves its 
proprietor as little as possible in dependence upon, or even in relations with, other 
people, and so leaves him free for the full austerity of citizenship in the classical sense." 
J.G.A. POCOCK, POLmcs, LANGUAGE AND TIME 91 (1971). As far as the point about 
dependence goes, Pocock is correct, but he is wrong to suggest that freehold was 
supposed to discourage relations with others. 
The independence of the freeholder, in American legal lore, was supposed to render 
him ideally suited to participate in civic life. It was thought to give him an interest that 
originated in his holding but transcended it. A good summary of this idea was given in 
the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1829-1830 by Philip N. Nicholas, a banker 
from Richmond: 
Ask one of our freeholders whose man he is, he will tell you he is his own 
man .... Do you believe, Mr. Chairman, that there is any property which 
attaches a man so much to the country as the land? There is none. His 
attachment to his home, is connected with the best sympathies of the human 
heart .... He will love his county which contains a home so dear to him, and 
defend that country at the hazard of his life. 
DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY: THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF 
THE 1820's, at 393 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1966). 
2. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
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of the Court for paying attention to the "equal treatment of individuals 
rather than the raising up of disadvantaged groups."' In a similar vein, 
Glendon criticizes the Court for its decision in Hodel v. Irving,' which 
struck down a Congressional reassignment to the Oglala Sioux tribe of 
lands previously owned by individual members of the tribe.' To 
Glendon the case reveals the "extreme vulnerability of communities to 
individual rights on the one hand, and to imperatives of the [S]tate on 
the other."6 Another author, Aviam Soifer, concurs in this judgment, 
writing that in Hodel the "right of the individual had to prevail, almost 
by definition, over all competing considerations, whether utilitarian or 
rights-based. "7 
The charge that American law is preoccupied with individualism does 
not stop at the Supreme Court, nor is it restricted to the present. Many 
commentators contend that this exclusive dedication to individual rights 
stretches far beyond the Court-that it bespeaks a systematic deficiency 
in American law and legal theory. Soifer writes that the problem lies at 
the heart of American law: "[T]he American legal system lacks any 
theory to handle groups. The dominant legal paradifm in American law 
is the relationship between individual and [S]tate." Glendon likewise 
complains that "groups or associations that stand between the individual 
and the [S]tate all too often meet with judicial incomprehension."9 
Glendon states Poletown's case in terms of "the interests of 
3. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: 
Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 600 (1993). 
4. 481 U.S. 704 (1987). 
5. Under the Dawes Allotment Act of 1887, tribal lands were distributed to tribe 
members in the belief that private ownership would make the Indians "civil" and 
promote assimilation. See generally JANET A. McDONNELL, THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE 
AMERICAN INDIAN (1991). Inheritance over the succeeding generations made individual 
holdings smaller and smaller, and Congress moved in 1983 to consolidate the small 
holdings and return them to the tribes. One tract of land owned by members of a Sioux 
tribe, described as "one of the most fractionated parcels of land in the world," boasted a 
forty-acre parcel owned by 439 people. See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 713. Two-thirds of these 
people received less than one dollar per year in rent, and the other third less than five 
cents. See id. 
6. GLENDON, supra note I, at 114. 
7. AVIAMS0IFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 84 (1995). 
8. Id. at I. 
9. GLENDON, supra note I, at I 14-15. Glendon criticizes the infamous decision 
in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), in a 
similar fashion. In this case, the court upheld a taking by the City of Detroit of land 
subsequently conveyed to General Motors. The taking was held to have a public purpose 
because it was effected in contemplation of increased employment in the area. See 
Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459. 
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communities." 10 She laments that its residents-because of ostensible 
defects in American rights-talk-"could not find a way to communicate 
effectively" about shared interests that stood apart from their individual 
property rights." 
Further, critics maintain that American law has shown a similar 
disregard for the group throughout American history. Despite the many 
labors of civic republicans in the law schools and history departments, 
the prevalent impression is that the United States has been devoted to the 
interests of the individual from its earliest days. Thus, Glendon, who 
agrees with Soifer on the current state of affairs, traces this concern with 
the individual to the founding of the republic: "In the beginning, that is, 
at the Founding, there was no particular reason for American statesmen 
to pay special attention to families, neighborhoods, or other small 
associations. These social systems were just there, seemingly 
'natural' .... " 12 Legal historian Stanley Katz agrees, contending that the 
federalism of the Constitution embodies a liberalism prevalent at the end of the 
eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries, which was concerned principally 
with individuals and with rights: "life, liberty, and property," in John Locke's 
famous formulation, or the right to pursue that form of social peace and 
prosperity that the eighteenth century referred to as "happiness. " 13 
Here Katz provides a convenient formulation that blends liberalism, 
rights, and the Constitution in defense of the proposition that the nation 
has been attentive to the rights of the individual from the very first. 
There are not many voices on the other side. Most notably, political 
theorist Barry Shain has denounced what he terms the "Myth of 
American Individualism," contending that American political thought is 
based on Protestant communitarian values rather than autonomous 
individual values." Legal scholar John Garvey has argued at length that 
theories of individual autonomy do not adequately explain why or how 
we should protect freedom." Otherwise, there is not much in the 
10. GLENDON, supra note I, at 110. 
I I. Id. at 111. 
12. Id. at 115. 
13. Stanley N. Katz, The Legal Framework of American Pluralism: Liberal 
Constitutionalism and the Protection of Groups, in BEYOND PLURALISM: THE 
CONCEPTION OF GROUPS AND GROUP IDENTITIES IN AMERICA 11, 12-13 (Wendy F. Katkin 
et al. eds., 1998). 
14. See generally BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: 
THE PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (] 994 ). 
15. See generally JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FoR? (1996). Garvey 
addresses this Article's concerns most explicitly in chapter eight (Groups) and chapter 
nine (Churches). See id. at 123-38, 139-54. In particular, Garvey argues against the 
individualist explanation and justification for group action and protection. ''The 
dominant school of thought about this problem maintains that group action has value 
because it is an aggregate of valued individual actions." Id. at 133. Although he does 
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scholarly world to undermine the notion that 
historically been committed to the individual at 
group.16 
American law has 
the expense of the 
But is the indictment of American jurisprudence for an undue concern 
for the rights of the individual well-founded? This Article argues that it 
is not. Commentators have been able to claim that American law favors 
the individual rather than the group only because they have ignored the 
group that the United States has traditionally championed: the 
corporation. If anything, American jurisprudence is hyper-corporate 
rather than hyper-individualistic. While critics impugn American legal 
culture for its anti-social tendencies and for its failure to protect the 
group, the group has actually enjoyed extraordinary protection 
throughout the course of American history. 
American society and law display a deep reverence for the group, as 
long as it assumes corporate or quasi-corporate form. This reverence is 
not fleeting; rather, it has deep historical roots. In fact, it was there 
before the republic came into being and it played a profound role in the 
founding of the nation. Moreover, these roots are not only traditional, 
but philosophical and religious as well. 
This Article explores those roots, with three goals in mind. First, to 
correct the mistaken notion that American law has historically 
demonstrated a commitment to the individual at the expense of the 
group, and to suggest how this critique should be restated. Second, to 
re-evaluate modem cases that are often thought to stand for expressions 
of individual rights, as cases actually protective of group rights. Third, 
to contend that American reverence for the corporate form explains why 
America's favorite group---the corporation-came to be as powerful as 
it is today." 
not deny that some organizational behavior is properly understood in such terms, Garvey 
insists that we must remember that much group activity can be understood only in terms 
of collective interests and goals, which are not identical with those of the individuals 
who compose the group. See id. at 138 ("We value actions by the group because they 
accomplish these interpersonal goals, or promote these goods."). 
16. Aviam Soifer occupies an unusual place in this debate. Although he maintains, 
as noted in this Article, that American law is dedicated to the relationship between the 
State and the individual-at the expense of intermediate groups-he implies that there is 
a marked need for an account of groups in American history. See SOIFER, supra note 7, 
at 73 ("Moreover, the absence of a sense of history remains one of the most noteworthy 
and most troubling aspects of recent treatment of groups in legal scholarship as well as at 
the highest levels of United States and English judge-made law."). 
17. The legal history of the corporation has never been seriously and 
systematically examined. The common wisdom is that the power of the American 
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Parts II and III of this Article establish the importance of the 
corporation in revolutionary America by comparing the fate of the 
corporation in the French and American Revolutions." Parts IV and V 
continue by analyzing one of the most important and most neglected 
subjects in the legal history of the new republic: the early nineteenth-
century controversy over the incorporation of churches.1' In Part VI, this 
Article first shows that an understanding of the corporate underpinnings 
of our jurisprudence calls for a re-evaluation of cases commonly 
believed to vindicate the rights of the individual. Then it returns to the 
critics of the supposed American individualism, arguing that their 
criticisms need to be redrawn so as to recognize the corporate character 
of the law. 
The "sanctity of association" is not just a phrase. It describes a 
commitment to joint action whose significance for modem and historical 
law has passed almost unnoticed. An appreciation of this sanctity has 
corporation is the result of a series of perfidious dealings-sometimes described in terms 
of collusion between businessmen and judges-which began around the time of the 
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and which were distinctly on-American. 
This Article challenges that assertion. arguing that the power of the corporation 
derives in large part from the American predisposition toward associations. 
Individualism was not at the center of political and legal theory in colonial and 
revolutionary America. Rather, in theory and in practice Americans thought in corporate 
terms; the eighteenth-century American intellectual heirs of John Locke, like Locke 
himself, were champions not of a neutral individualism, but of a corporate liberalism. 
For the use of this phrase with respect to the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, see generally R. JEFFREY LUSTIG, CORPGRA TE LIBERALISM: THE ORIGINS OF 
MODERN AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY, 1890-1920 (1982). 
18. In both practice and theory, the French were hostile toward corporate life while 
Americans proved, generally, to be hospitable. See infra Parts II-III. 
19. This issue is important because it shows that when Americans had to resolve 
the most difficult kind of problems, they quickly turned to corporations. Moreover, in 
the life of the churches, as in that of the nation, the Revolution led to a struggle between 
democratic and hierarchical social ordering. The history of religious incorporation thus 
provides a Jens through which to view the dilemmas confronting the new republic and it 
illustrates vividly the fact that the new nation had committed itself at a very early date to 
allowing small republics to dwell within its borders-borders both geographic and legal. 
Part V concludes by arguing that the incorporation of churches was the first step in a 
general relocation of sovereignty in corporations. General incorporation of religious 
societies paved the way for general incorporation of business societies and, as the 
century progressed, legislatures announced that people did not need the permission of the 
sovereign-Le., the Legislature-to form corporations. Originally, corporations could 
form only with the permission of the monarch, as granted in a special charter. Special 
incorporation was eventually replaced in most states by general incorporation, which 
allowed incorporation on a much more widespread basis. Courts obliged the corporators 
as well. From the time of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 518 (1819), well beyond Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 
U.S. 394 (1886), the constitutional law of corporations took deep breaths of American 
political theory. In the process, the corporation became a person. Although many 
contend that this was only an artificial person, the Jaw resorted to artifice because it 
found itself dealing with a distinctive and collective moral being. See infra Part V. 
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two lessons to teach: one about the present and one about the past. 
Constitutional law cannot be fully understood without reference to 
enduring moral postulates on the importance of association. Because we 
have focused on the individual rather than the corporation as the bearer 
of rights, we have misconceived the nature of the liberty that is protected 
by American law. The historical significance, which is highlighted by 
the experience of the churches, is that it is wrong to believe that the 
Founders committed the new nation to pure individualism-and thus to 
neutrality-in such important matters as religion. In practice, the nation 
committed itself to freedom as conceived in a Christian and Protestant 
light. This was freedom defined within corporate bounds, that is to say, 
a freedom based on widely-shared moral understandings. Moreover, the 
modern tendency to discount the influence of religion on the American 
past has led us to miss the important role of churches in the growth of 
general incorporation and thereby to forget the undeniably "moral" 
origins of the corporation. 
II. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND CORPORATE LIFE 
Why tum to the French Revolution in an Article about corporatism in 
the United States? One reason is that the French republican approach to 
the corporation is strikingly different from the American approach and 
thus provides an instructive contrast. 
The common view is that the United States is so hostile to groups that 
it tends to wear away their very identities over time. As Soifer puts it, 
"Much law is devoted to macadamizing and pulverizing,"20 by which he 
means that American law puts inordinate pressure on groups. Yet it was 
the French Revolution, rather than the American, that showed 
unremitting hostility toward the corporation. The theory and practice of 
French anti-corporatism will help put American attitudes into 
perspective. 
Critics of the American approach often show an affinity for European 
alternatives and seem especially beguiled by French ways. They have 
been quick to point to the efforts of European nations, notably France, 
for commendable examples of group protection.21 Glendon prefers 
20. SOIFER, supra note 7, at 137. 
21. Other scholars have noted a tendency on the part of legal theorists and 
historians to look abroad for theories to explain American political and constitutional 
life. See, e.g., I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 5-6 (1991); Martin 
S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
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Rousseau, the philosopher of the French Revolution, to John Locke, 
comparing the Genevan favorably to "the stolid English and Scottish 
writers of 'republican' persuasion for whom private property was the 
necessary base for the virtuous independent-minded citizen. "22 Professor 
Frank Michelman approves of "the modem republican commitment to 
social plurality"23 and of the Western philosophical tradition celebrating 
"values that are communal and objective."24 He finds these values in a 
tradition that stretches from Aristotle through Rousseau to Kant." Cass 
Sunstein, in arguing for a diversity-enhancing approach to education that 
corresponds to the position of the antifederalists, notes a similarity 
between "the antifederalists' views and those of Rousseau."26 Elsewhere 
he lauds the governments of France, Germany, Italy, and Britain for 
promoting "high-quality broadcasting"" and the German Constitutional 
Court for promoting diversity on German television." Akhil Amar, in 
arguing that the Bill of Rights actually does protect the rights of groups, 
relies on Rousseau to help make the point.29 
523, 529-35 (1995). 
22. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 32. 
23. Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1532-33 (1988). 
24. Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: 
Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 150 
(1977-1978). 
25. See id. In drawing this single line, Michelman forgets that French thought on 
the character of civic personality was quite different from American. Thus, he cites 
Hannah Arendt's On Revolution for her "stunningly expressed commendations of 
freedom as 'public happiness."' Id. at 152 n.30. Yet in hoping to find a style of thought 
that applies to American constitutional practice, he does not see the difference between a 
French approach to sovereignty and an Anglo-American approach. Arendt, however, 
was quite aware of the difference, noting that 
just as Montesquieu's theory of the separation of powers had become 
axiomatic for American political thought because it took its cue from the 
English constitution, so Rousseau's notion of a General Will, inspiring and 
directing the nation as though it were no longer composed of a multitude but 
actually formed one person, became axiomatic for all factions and parties of 
the French Revolution, because it was indeed the theoretical substitute for the 
sovereign will of an absolute monarch. 
HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 155 (1963). 
26. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
29, 36 n.31 (1985) ("Similarities between the antifederalists' views and those of 
Rousseau are readily apparent. Surprisingly, however, Rousseau's name seldom 
appeared in the antifederalist literature and is mentioned only once in The Complete 
Anti-Federalist."). 
27. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 80 ( 1993). 
On the subject of the popularity of Jerry Lewis movies in France, Sunstein maintains a 
dignified silence. 
28. See id. at 77-79. 
29. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
26 (1998), which states: 
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A study of French approaches to incorporation argues strongly that it 
is wrong to look overseas for the best examples of group protection. The 
phrase "macadamizing and pulverizing" comes from the medieval 
historian Maitland, who used it to call attention to a very strong 
tendency on the part of the French to pulverize groups smaller than the 
State. Indeed, Soifer credits Maitland fully for his insight, asserting that 
"it was Maitland who led the brigade of the leading English legal 
scholars to urge the ubiquitous reality and vital importance of group 
entities."'° In fact, in his writings Maitland contrasted the United States 
with France, pointing to the United States as a land in which group 
personality was finding a home in law.31 
Maitland's insight was extremely important, but its significance has 
not been fully appreciated. Others have been sensible of a distinction 
between France and America on the notion of a "general will," but 
Maitland traced the operation of the unitary will to a general theory 
hostile to the corporation and trust. When he sought an example of a 
legal culture that was hostile to groups, he turned to France. Conceding 
that England was itself heading in the French direction and noting that 
Hobbes thought of corporations----organized groups within the State-as 
"troublesome entozoa,"32 Maitland cautioned that it was in France rather 
than England where "we may see the pulverizing, macadamizing 
tendency in all its glory ... reducing to impotence, and then to nullity, 
all that intervenes between Man and State."33 
reservation of the collective right of We the People to assemble in a future 
convention and exercise our sovereign right to alter or abolish our government. 
In the words of Rousseau's ... social contract, "the sovereign can act only 
when the people are assembled." 
Id. (quoting 3 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Du CONTRAT SOCIAL CH. XII (1762)) (emphasis 
added). 
30. SOIFER, supra note 7, at 73. 
3 I. See FREDERICK w. MAITLAND, Moral Personality and Legal Personality, in 
MAITLAND: SELECTED ESSAYS 223, 229 (H.D. Hazeltine et al. eds .• 1936). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. Maitland is introduced here for several reasons. The first is that his work 
suggested the approach that this Article takes. The second is that he saw quite clearly, 
long before others, that the problems involved in respecting corporate rights-"group" 
rights-pertain to many sorts of corporate entities, and that to solve them requires some 
understanding of what constitutes group personality. 
Are corporations merely fictional persons? To answer that they are is to subscribe to a 
doctrine of utility that has never been fully accepted in the United States, although courts 
have often said that they are. For if the State creates the corporate entities that live 
within its borders, it may dismantle them at will. Maitland's essential point in this 
regard is that in both England and the United States there are a great many corporate 
109 
He was right. 34 With a clarity and ferocity not to be found in 
revolutionary America, spokesmen for French nationhood made clear on 
many occasions that true liberty was expressed in the direct relationship 
between the individual citizen and the nation. It had little room for 
intermediate bodies larger than the natural individual but smaller than 
the State. 
A. The French Revolution and the Attack on Corporations 
The French did not mince words. On August 18, 1792, the National 
Assembly decreed that a "State that is truly free ought not to suffer 
within its bosom any corporation, not even such as, being dedicated to 
public instruction, have merited well of the country."" On the basis of 
this absolutist doctrine regarding corporate life, the French government 
reached into facets of life that the American government has rarely 
presumed to reach. By 1792 some very un-American things had been 
justified by this line of thought. 
As everyone knows, the French Revolution established the nation as 
the protector of the individual and the enemy of privilege based on 
tradition.'• The Declaration of the Rights of Man begins with the 
promise that "Men are born, and always continue, free and equal in 
respect of their rights. Civil distinctions, therefore, can be founded only 
entities organized to different ends, and that an answer meant to decide a question with 
regard to profit-making concerns may just as well implicate religious bodies. 
One of the important implications of his observation is that those who would protect 
"group" rights are going to have to consider that opposing interests may have excellent 
claims of their own to recognition as a group. Another is that adherents of group 
protections, though they may either deny or fail to realize it, will often argue on some 
premise of natural law. What is it, for instance, that privileges the integrity of the racial 
group over that of the State? The answer is trickier than many care to acknowledge. 
Moreover, Maitland observed that a theory of corporate rights cannot confine itself to 
the ordinary rubrics of law. As has been said above, modern analysts tend to want to 
protect the "social" claim of the group against the property claim of the individual. 
Maitland knew that no such division could be made easily, and that groups claimed to 
own property just as individuals did. Thus, he reminded his readers that the debates of 
the French Revolution on the ecclesiastical settlement were about property as well as 
status; in fact, his studies lead us to say that the two are always found together. See id. at 
230. The question, "Who owes this debt to the nation?" is closely related to the 
question, "Is this entity a juristic person?" 
34. Maitland moved on to note that the ownership of other property was open to 
the same attack that succeeded against the church. If the State was a "real" person who 
could take property from "artificial" persons such as the church, other corporate 
individuals had to worry at the example: "And as with the churches, the universities, the 
trade-gilds, and the like, so also with the communes, the towns and villages." Id. at 230. 
35. Id. at 229-30. 
36. See JOHN MCMANNERS, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE CHURCH 25 (1969) 
( explaining revolutionary policy regarding the Catholic Church in "light of the attack on 
privilege which was the driving force of the Revolution"). 
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on public utility ,"37 The body to decide questions of public utility was 
the "Nation," considered in the third article of the Declaration to be 
"essentially the source of all sovereignty."'' 
France had moved very quickly to give legal expression to its theory 
of corporations. On November 2, 1789, the National Assembly passed 
an act confiscating the lands held by church corporations; from then on 
all such property was to be "at the disposal of the nation."39 The nation 
would, in turn, pay for the support of the clergy and for the maintenance 
of religion. Although the Declaration provided for the protection of 
property,'° the fate of the church showed that no similar protection was 
to be afforded to corporations. This corporate insecurity had been hinted 
at in the statement that "civil distinction," i.e., inequality, could be 
sanctioned only for reasons of "public utility." 
Soon after its property was sacrificed on the altar of national 
necessity, the Catholic Church lost control of its own workings. The 
constitution of the French Church itself was changed by the Assembly, 
which passed the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in July of 1790.41 
Aside from providing for the election of bishops and priests, the Civil 
Constitution took a further remarkable step: it decreed that papal 
pronouncements of any kind were no longer to have any force "unless 
they have been presented to the legislative body, seen and verified by 
it."42 Papal documents were not even to be distributed, read, or 
published until they had been sanctioned by the Assembly. 
This system of censorship is instructive because it sharpens the 
distinction between an individual liberty and a group liberty. The 
Declaration had promised that because the "unrestrained communication 
of thoughts and opinions [was] one of the most precious [r]ights of 
37. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS BY THE NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY OF FRANCE ( 1789), reprinted in REVOLUTION FROM 1789 TO 1906, at 30, 30 
(R.W. Postgate ed., Harper & Brothers 1962) (1920). 
38. Id. 
39. DECREE CONFISCATING CHURCH LANDS, NOVEMBER 2, 1789, reprinted in 
REVOLUTION FROM 1789 TO 1906, supra note 37, at 32, 32. 
40. The last article upheld the right to property: "The right to property being 
inviolable and sacred, no one ought to be deprived of it, except in cases of evident public 
necessity, legally ascertained, and on condition of a previous just indemnity." 
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF 
FRANCE, supra note 37, at 3 I. 
4 I. See THE CIVIL CONSTITUTION OF THE CLERGY (1790), reprinted in THE 
CONSTITUTIONS AND OTHER SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF 
FRANCE 1789-1907, at 16, 16 (Frank Maloy Anderson ed., 2d ed. 1908). 
42. Id. at 23. 
111 
[m]an, every citizen may speak, write, and publish freely, provided he is 
responsible for the abuse of this liberty, in cases determined by the 
law.'"'' It was made obvious that this protection did not extend to 
corporate communications. Thus, it is striking that the revolutionaries 
promised an "unrestrained communication" at the same time they aimed 
to restrict the kind of corporate speech that the Pope engaged in. 
Such anti-corporate actions were premised on the belief that the nation 
ought to exercise a general superintendency over all the groups within its 
borders. The opportunistic cleric, Talleyrand,44 insisted that property 
belonging to clergymen was different from other property because it was 
intended for a function, rather than for the enrichment of individuals." 
Even if the nation did not have the right to destroy the whole body of the 
clergy, Talleyrand believed that the State was entitled to "destroy 
particular aggregations of this corps if it judges them harmful or simply 
useless.'""' Talleyrand went further still. Not only did the nation, by 
right, have control over the property belonging to religious bodies, it 
possessed "a very extended empire over all corporate bodies existing 
within its confines.'"'' It was equally true that the "Nation, for the very 
reason that it is protector of the wishes of the founders, can, and even 
must, suppress benefices that have come to have no functions.'"'' 
Talleyrand explained at some length just how extensive the authority of 
the State was to be: 
One is always correct in saying, in ordinary language, that the properties 
were given to the Church: which has never meant anything, if not that these 
properties have been, to the discharge of the State, destined for the use of 
religion, the maintenance of the temples, the relief of the poor, and, finally, for 
works of public benefit, and they must always fulfill this intended objective. 
One is also correct in saying that they were given irrevocably; ... they are 
irrevocably assigned for this purpose, whatever fate may befall the particular 
corps they were assigned to at first. ... 49 
Talleyrand thus made his stand on the use to which the property could be 
applied, but he did not appear to quibble with the idea that the nation 
was entitled to enforce these uses. '0 
43. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS BY THE NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY OF FRANCE, supra note 37, at 31. 
44. McManners explains that Talleyrand, in going along with the attack on church 
properties, was "planning a political career based upon collaboration with the 
inevitable." McMANNERS, supra note 36, at 27. 
45. See Talleyrand on Ecclesiastical Property, in THE FRENCH REVOLUTION l 13, 
114-15 (Paul H. Beik ed., 1970). 
46. Id. at 115. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 116 n.l (emphasis added). 
50. This Article does not mean to suggest that there was no disagreement on such 
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The treatment of the Catholic Church in the French Revolution 
illustrates a thorough contempt for corporations in general, and the 
attack on corporate activity reached far beyond the church. In June of 
1791 the Assembly passed a law restricting association of laborers.'1 
The first article of the French Constitution laid out its anti-corporate 
premise explicitly: "[the] destruction of all kinds of corporations of 
Citizens of the same status and profession being one of the fundamental 
bases of the French Constitution," they were no longer to be tolerated." 
It is tempting to think that the French were merely abolishing 
outmoded associations so as to bring the nation into the next century. It 
is difficult to take issue with the Constitution of 179 I in its desire to 
eliminate "irrevocably the institutions that have injured liberty and the 
equality of rights."" The Constitution seems equally reasonable as it 
notes that, according to this desire, the Assembly has abolished the 
nobility. 54 
Yet the anti-corporate tendency becomes more obvious as the 
Constitution observes that associations of professions have been made 
unlawful and that the "law no longer recognizes religious vows, nor any 
other obligation which may be contrary to natural rights or to the 
issues. In the debate on the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, for instance, the 
Archbishop of Aix reproached the revolutionaries for usurping a spiritual jurisdiction. 
Christ had not assigned the maintenance of the spiritual life to magistrates, but to the 
Apostles and their successors: "Jesus Christ gave his mission to the apostles and their 
successors for the well-being of the faithful; he entrusted it neither to magistrates nor to 
the king: his concern was an order in which magistrates and kings must obey." 6 
H!STOIRE PARLEMENTAIRE DE LA REVOLUTION FRANCAISE, Ou JOURNAL DES 
ASSEMBLEES NATI6NALES, DEPUIS 1789 JUSQU'EN 1815 11 (Paris, B. Buchez & P. Roux 
eds., 1834) [hereinafter H!STOIRE PARLEMENTAIRE] ("Jesus-Christ a donne sa mission 
aux apotres et a ses successeurs pour le salut des fideles; ii ne !'a confiee ni aux 
magistrats, ni au roi: ii s'agit d'un ordre de choses dans lequel !es magistrats et !es rois 
doivent obeir."). In the same debate, one M. le cure le Clerc contended that the spiritual 
power belonged to the church, and that it was imprescriptible: "The powers of the church 
are inalienable and imprescriptible; their essence is divine: she may thus exercise them in 
all their independence." Id. at 19 ("Les pouvoirs de l'eglise sont inalienables et 
imprescriptibles; leur essence est divine: elle peut done !es excercer dans toute leur 
independance. "). 
51. See LAW OF JUNE 14, 1791 ON ASSOCIATIONS, reprinted in REVOLUTION FROM 
1789 TO 1906, supra note 37, at 37, 37. 
52. Id. The greatest failure of the United States to allow freedom of association, of 
course, comes in the area of labor. 
53. CONSTITUTION OF 1791, reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS AND OTHER SELECT 
DOCUMENTS lLLUSTRA TIVE OF THE HISTORY OF FRANCE 1789-1907, supra note 41, at 58, 
61. 
54. See id. 
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constitution."" This mistrust of associative activity is made still more 
clear by the provision for freedom of petition because the guarantee 
applies only to the individual: the citizen enjoys "[l]iberty to address 
individually signed petitions to the constituted authorities."06 Persons 
gathered in assembly do not enjoy the right. 
The attack went further still. Workers' corporations (i.e., labor 
unions) had been prohibited by the Decree for Reorganizing the Local 
Government System, passed in December of 1789." Citizens were to 
meet in assemblies and it was provided that the assemblies were to form 
themselves not "by crafts, professions, or corporations, but by quarters 
or districts."" The law on association stipulated that "[c]itizens of a like 
calling or profession, employers, shopkeepers, workers and 
journeymen . . . shall not, when they shall meet together, name a 
president, or secretaries, or syndics, nor keep registers, nor pass 
resolutions or make decisions, nor form regulations for their so-called 
common interests."" 
It is evident from all this activity that there was a principle at work, 
one that made for a persistent theme in French history. The French were 
to restrict association, particularly religious association, for more than a 
hundred years to come. The Law of Associations, passed in 1901, 
provided that "[n]o religious congregation can be formed without an 
authorisation given by a law which shall determine the conditions of its 
operation.""' Congregations already in existence that failed to meet the 
requirement were to be dissolved, their property to be liquidated in 
court.61 
To the question of the proper place of the corporation in a republic, 
the French had given a resoundingly clear answer. The French 
Revolution was a program designed to reeducate persons into citizens 
and to reconfigure corporations into units serviceable to the republic. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 62. 
57. DECREES FOR REORGANIZING THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM, reprinted in 
THE CONSTITUTIONS AND OTHER SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF 
FRANCE 1789-1907, supra note 41, at 24, 25. 
58. Id. 
59. DECREE UPON THE ORGANIZATION OF TRADES AND PROFESSIONS (1791), 
reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS AND OTHER SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE 
HISTORY OF FRANCE 1789-1907, supra note 41, at 43, 43. 
60. LAW OF ASSOCIATIONS, reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS AND OTHER SELECT 
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF FRANCE 1789-1907, supra note 41, at 659, 
660. 
61. See id. at 661. 
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B. Rousseau: Association, Republicanism, and the Citizen 
Why was this their response? The answer is that there was a theory 
underlying the practice: that only the nation and the citizen possessed a 
civic personality. The revolutionary Thouret put it most succinctly in 
declaring that because "the suppression of a corporation is not murder[,] 
the revocation of a corporation's right to possess the funds of the land is 
not a theft."62 In other words, a corporation is not a person and thus was 
to be subjected to the "general will," which was the only force that could 
"effect the destruction of everything."" 
He thus appears to leave the individual, whose destruction is murder, 
secure in the possession of his property. The individual, it appears, is a 
"natural" individual, a person protected in all that is his by the 
increasingly "natural" state. Thouret' s reference to the general will was 
itself a recapitulation of a much lengthier formulation by Rousseau, who 
had insisted that the maintenance of the "general will" depended on the 
direct relation between the individual and the State, unmediated by 
corporate entities. 64 As far as Rousseau was concerned, a government 
that presided over associations was one that could not give voice to the 
general will; if "the general will is to be truly expressed," he wrote, "it is 
essential that there be no subsidiary groups within the State, and that 
each citizen voice his own opinion and nothing but his own opinion."65 
This mistrust of corporate activity can be translated directly into a 
dislike of society itself. 66 Rousseau was not consistent in his feelings 
toward society, but he evinced deep doubts about the benefits that it 
conferred. Society appears to be little more than a collective illness in 
some of his writings: "[O]ne is strongly inclined to believe that the 
history of human illnesses could easily be written by following that of 
62. HENRI HA YEM, LE DROIT DE PROPRIETE ET SES LIMITES 196-97 (I 910) ("la 
suppression d'un corps n'est pas un homicide," "la revocation de la faculte aux corps de 
posseder des fonds de terre ne sera pas une spoliation."). 
63. Id. ("[!]! n'y a que la volonte publique qui puisse operer la renonciation de 
tous .... " ). 
64. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), reprinted in SOCIAL 
CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME AND ROUSSEAU 167, 194 (Ernest Barker ed. & 
Gerard Hopkins trans., 1948). 
65. Id. 
66. Rousseau's attitudes varied over time, and some of his writings are more 
amenable toward society. Yet it is still safe to say that the society of which he approves 
is closely regulated by a central intelligence, and that it is not characterized by 
autonomous associations. 
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civil societies."" Association denatures man, with terrible results, for 
"[i]n becoming sociable and a slave he becomes weak, fearful, [and] 
servile. "68 In his more extreme statements Rousseau took aim at 
cooperation itself: "[F]rom the moment one man needed the help of 
another ... equality disappeared, property was introduced .... "69 
His solution to the problem is what sets Rousseau apart from his 
American contemporaries: it is to make the representative superior to the 
constituent. What was needed, he claimed, was a sovereign author who 
would prevent the evils of association.10 He made this point most 
dramatically in his essay on the theatre, which emphasized the 
importance of authorship in overcoming the debased condition of 
society.11 Having explained the deleterious influence that immoral 
theatre exerts on a society, he contended that the proper function of 
drama was moral education." How could this be done by actors who 
were themselves no better than the people they were to educate? It was 
certain that "[ w ]e will, then, at first have bad actors, and we will at first 
be bad judges. Will they form us or will we form them?"" 
The danger to public morals was so great, he insisted, that the only 
remedy was for the State to write the plays: "[The solution] is, in order 
to make the dramas of our theatre suitable to us, to compose them 
ourselves; we should have authors before we have actors."14 If we were 
to translate this into a maxim of republican political life, we would say, 
"Authorities come before constituents." 
III. THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE PuBLIC CORPORATION 
A. The Colonial Beginnings of Corporate Culture 
"We are a company," declared Governor John Winthrop in the famous 
speech he delivered as he and a shipload of fellow Puritans sailed from 
England to found a religious commonwealth in New England in 1630." 
In using the word "company" Winthrop was probably speaking 
67. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of 
Inequality Among Men (Second Discourse), in JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE FIRST AND 
SECOND DISCOURSES 77, 110 (Roger D. Masters ed., Roger D. Masters & Judith R. 
Masters trans., 1964 ). 
68. Id. at Ill. 
69. Id. at 151. 
70. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, POLITICS AND THE ARTS: LETTER TO M. 
D' ALEMBERT ON THE THEATRE 119-20 (Allan Bloom trans., 1968). 
71. See id. 
72. See id. 
73. Id. at 119 (emphasis added). 
7 4. Id. at 120 ( emphasis added). 
75. SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, BUll.DERS OF THE BAY COLONY 72-73 (1930). 
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informally, but it is true that Massachusetts was not only a company of 
Christians but a corporation as well." Winthrop continued by explaining 
the Christian purpose of the enterprise in republican terms, cautioning 
that "the care of the publique must oversway all private respects."" 
Such attention to the general good was necessary to ensure "that 
ourselves and posterity may be the better preserved from the common 
corruptions of this evil world."" 
Winthrop and his company were launching an early English corporate 
republican venture in the New World, but it was not the only one. To 
the south lay Virginia, a colony that had also begun its life as a 
corporation and was at the same time a small nation.79 English colonists 
had begun a venerable tradition in which corporators dedicated their 
property and their labors ( or the labors of others) to a public purpose. 
Their early endeavors also led to a threefold legacy that was to endure 
long after the American Revolution: a dogged insistence on the rights of 
the people rather than the rights of the person, a habit of federated 
government, and a firm belief in a Providential social contract. This last 
point may be the most important because it is the least understood. 
Modern commentators assume that social contracts are premised on a 
rampant individualism. However, the contracts that colonial Americans 
liked to cite were contracts between a people, such as the people of 
Massachusetts Bay, and a ruler, such as God or a monarch.8° 
These agreements were much more explicitly religious in seventeenth-
century New England than in other times and places, but when the 
Stamp Act prompted the colonies to begin declaring their rights in the 
mid-l 760s, they did not waste their time on theories involving individual 
social contracting; instead they emphasized the various agreements that 
the English monarch had supposedly entered into with his English-
76. As Robert Cover puts it, "Perhaps the most compelling historical example of 
the use of private law in the generation of a nomos was the creation of a polity out of the 
corporate charter of Massachusetts Bay." Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 31 (1983). 
77. MORISON, supra note 75, at 73. 
78. Id. 
79. Colonial Virginia is often thought to be utterly unlike colonial Massachusetts, 
in that Virginia was devoted exclusively to profit, whereas Massachusetts dedicated itself 
to the promotion of religion. For a very effective statement of the position that Virginia 
was also interested in religious advancement, see PERRY MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE 
WILDERNESS 99 (1956). 
80. On the extremely complicated subject of the various covenants in which the 
Puritans believed, see PERRY MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: THE SEVENTEENTH 
CENTURY 365-462 ( 1954 ). 
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American peoples." To demonstrate the religious character of American 
liberty at length would go beyond the bounds of this Article, but it must 
be noted because it accounts for much of the communal content of 
American liberty as well." It can hardly be denied that Revolutionary 
ideology retained Protestant overtones, at the very least." 
How can this corporate Protestant ideology be reconciled with the 
individualistic philosophy of John Locke? Given the obvious 
indebtedness of the founding generation to John Locke and his 
reputation as a proponent of a neutral individualism, it is necessary to 
emphasize that he was closer to Governor Winthrop's views than we 
now think. Thomas Jefferson, for instance, thought of Locke in the 
company of republicans such as Sidney.84 He was not an individualist in 
any modem sense, and his constitutional thought was largely religious in 
origin. Locke has an undeserved reputation for individualist thought 
because we have focused on the wrong part of his story." Modem 
commentators have been impressed, favorably or not, with the fact that 
Locke devoted much attention in the Second Treatise to the activities of 
individuals in a state of nature. Gordon Wood, for example, writes that 
Locke's social contract is "not a governmental contract between 
magistrates and people, rulers and ruled, but an agreement among 
81. For documents emanating from the Stamp Act, see generally PROLOGUE TO 
REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764-1766 
(Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959). For an excellent assessment of the controversy over the 
Stamp Act, see generally EDMUND s. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT 
CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION (2d ed. 1962). 
82. For an extended argument on the religious character of American corporatism 
and for a denial that American political thought is individualistic, see generally SHAIN, 
supra note 14. Although Shain exaggerates the religious dimension, he provides a 
wealth of evidence showing that the role of religion has been underestimated in 
understanding the nature of theories of American freedom. 
83. See EDMUND s. MORGAN, THE CHALLENGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 88 
(1976). 
84. "When Jefferson refers to Locke's politics, he links him, not with Bacon and 
Newton, but invariably with Sidney." GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 17] (I 978). 
85. See SHAIN, supra note 14, at 191-92. Shain explains that Locke's belief in 
independence does not translate into anything like modern individualism. According to 
Locke, he writes, a man "was free when he was allowed to participate in the shaping of 
the laws that would bind him." Id. at 191. This contrasts with the individualism of John 
Stuart Mill, who believed 
that all societal limitations that go beyond the similar protection of other 
autonomous individuals, whether tacitly consented to or not, were repressive 
and illegitimate. 
In this sense, Americans in the 18th century may have been Lockean, but 
this does not mean that they understood personal or familial independence in a 
modern individualist fashion any more than Locke likely did. 
Id. at 192. 
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isolated individuals in a state of nature to combine in a society."" 
Glendon likens Locke's man in a state of nature to that of Hobbes, 
because what they share is solitude: "Locke's man, too, was a loner."" 
Because he begins with individuals and the property they accrue in a 
state of nature, Locke is held to be a proponent of individualism. 
What we often forget is that the actual aim of the Second Treatise was 
to defend the rights of the people against a greedy monarch. Locke's 
individuals did not stay in a state of nature for very long. They quickly 
associated so as to protect a corporate right against encroachment by an 
individual. Thus, he maintained that "when the government is dissolved, 
the people are at liberty to provide for themselves ... for the society can 
never by the fault of another lose the native and original right it has to 
preserve itself."" The Second Treatise is actually anti-individualistic in 
that it takes the most powerful individual in the land and makes him a 
mere trustee of a corporate good. 
Moreover, although Locke did offer a secular justification for popular 
sovereignty, his message was distinctly religious in two senses. The 
Second Treatise was written because of the conflict between James II 
and his Protestant subjects. The rift had developed in large part because 
of the belief that James intended to make England Catholic." The 
original enemy of a Protestant people had been the Pope, but several 
Stuart monarchs had made themselves (at least as many of their subjects 
saw the matter) into allies of the Pope and thus into enemies of the 
Protestants.9° The Second Treatise was meant to weigh in on the side of 
Protestantism as one of the rights of a free people. 
Locke's argument is also explicitly religious. A glance at the Second 
Treatise shows that arguments about the state of nature are liberally 
complemented with Biblical proof. The famous argument on property, 
for instance, begins with an appeal to both reason and revelation.'1 
86. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 
283 (2d ed. 1998). Wood maintains that Americans relied on this formulation 
increasingly in the years after 1776. See id. 
87. GLENDON, supra note I, at 68. 
88. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT§ 220, at 123 (Thomas 
P. Peardon ed., 1952). 
89. See EDMUND s. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 100 (1988). 
90. See id. at 100-17. 
91. See id.§ 25, at 16. Locke stated: 
Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us that men, being once born, 
have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat [sic] and drink and 
119 
Because Locke was arguing against the theory that the monarch held his 
position by virtue of divine right, this religious emphasis makes sense. 
As Edmund S. Morgan has shown, the triumph of popular sovereignty 
meant that the divine right of monarchs was replaced by the divine right 
of the people; thinkers such as Locke played an important part in the 
transition.' In the process, they did not exclude God from political and 
legal theory so much as re-identify the earthly agent through whom He 
manifested His will-the collective entity known as "the people."" 
A final point, coming from Locke's involvement in colonial affairs, 
helps to correct the common misconception regarding the kind of society 
and government he favored. He is well known for the declaration that 
"in the beginning all the world was America."" This statement conjures 
an image of a multitude of possessive individuals acquiring property in a 
state of nature; however, the plan of government that he designed for 
these wilds had a distinctly feudal flavor." The Fundamental 
Constitutions that he drafted for the Carolinas in 1669 provided that a 
hereditar~ nobility would own two-fifths of the land in the new 
colonies. 6 The members of this class would also compose the upper 
house of the Legislature and would propose legislation to the lower 
house, which would vote on acceptance but would not be able to 
amend." Such a plan was obviously premised not on any theory of the 
primacy of the individual, but on a theory that sought the common good 
by balancing the various parts of the State. Locke was a republican, as 
Jefferson maintained, although his republicanism had an aristocratic 
flavor to it. 
such other things as nature affords for their subsistence; or revelation, which 
gives us an account of those grants God made of the world to Adam, and to 
Noah and his sons; it is very clear that God, as King David says, "has given the 
earth to the children of men," given it to mankind in common. 
Id. (quoting Psalm 115:16). 
92. See MORGAN, supra note 89, at 119-20. 
93. Id. at 267. Thus, Morgan maintains that James Madison "invented" an 
American people in order to make up for the deficiencies of a national government 
hamstrung by state sovereignty: 
Id. 
To that end he envisioned a genuine national government, resting for its 
authority, not on the state governments and not even on the peoples of the 
several states considered separately, but on an American people, a people who 
constituted a separate and superior entity, capable of conveying to a national 
government an authority that would necessarily impinge on the authority of the 
state governments. 
94. LOCKE, supra note 88, § 49, at 29. 
95. See id. 
96. See MORGAN, supra note 89, at 129. 
97. See id. 
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B. The American Revolution and Individualism 
The preoccupation with group rights that characterized both the early 
history of the colonies and the political thought that colonists read made 
itself evident in the American Revolution. Locke's linking of 
individualism with tyranny, and the coupling of his constitutional theory 
with religious belief, was reproduced in the American colonies at the 
time of the Revolution. Thus, the Reverend Samuel West emphasized, 
in a sermon given in Boston in 1776, that a claim made by a 
representative and collective body against an individual was 
presumptively legitimate: 
If it be asked, Who are the proper judges to determine when rulers are guilty of 
tyranny and oppression? I answer, the public. Not a few disaffected 
individuals, but the collective body of the [S]tate ... for, as it is the collective 
body that invests rulers with their power and authority, so it is the collective 
body that has the sole right of judging whether rulers act up to the end of their 
institution or not. ... [T]he public is always willing to be rightly informed, and 
when it has proper matter of conviction laid before it its judgment is always 
right.98 
West's argument here is very similar to Locke's, and it is also the 
argument made in the Declaration of lndependence~that a sovereign 
individual who engages in "a long train of abuses" must be made to pay 
the price by the people who suffered at his hands:• This emphasis on 
association was to be affirmed repeatedly in the practices of the 
revolutionaries. Although the colonies began modestly with their 
assemblies, in just a few years associations, congresses, and conventions 
besieged the new nation. 
The next two decades would show that locating this people, this 
"collective body of the State," was more difficult than it sounded 
because there was no single body of the State. It was a federated body, 
and just as federalism had formed an essential part of the argument 
against British measures such as the Stamp Act and Sugar Act, so it 
would influence the political life of the new nation. In the end, many 
federated bodies would emerge, and the corporation would be among 
them. 
98. SAMUEL WEST, ON THE RIGHT TO REBEL AGAINST GOVERNORS (ELECTION DAY 
SERMON) (Boston 1776), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE 
FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805, at 419, 423 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 
1983). 
99. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); LOCKE, supra note 
88, § 225, at 126. 
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C. A Corporate Political Theory for the New Nation 
The great driving engine behind the corporatism of American politics 
was federalism, for it was a truism that a national representative 
assembly had to provide for a variety of local interests. The colonists 
who had opposed British measures in the 1760s and 1770s had insisted 
that the Empire was a federation, and they did not retreat from their 
belief in federation after the Revolution. The interplay between the 
national government and the states is one of the fascinating features of 
early national life. The First Continental Congress of 1774 was brought 
into being, as Edmund S. Morgan observes, by "regular colonial 
assemblies, by extralegal provincial congress, [and] by committees of 
correspondence."100 In tum, the Second Congress announced that each 
colony was a "free and independent state."101 
Americans, attached to their notions of federalism and separation of 
powers, were committed to the idea that there had to be counter-
balancing corporations within a well-governed nation. Thomas 
Jefferson, who was among the most French of the Founders, was hostile 
to granting privileges to what we now would call "private" 
corporations. 10 Yet he believed that it was the essence of the union to 
have federated bodies within the frame of a national government. In his 
first inaugural address he proclaimed: "We are all republicans-we are 
federalists."103 French republicans could not have said the same. 
Indeed, French republican theory held that there was a national 
supremacy over all the bodies within the nation104 -a belief antithetical 
to Jefferson's assertion that the United States government enjoyed only 
those limited powers conferred by the states. He wrote that their 
"association as a nation was only for special purposes ... and the states 
composing the association chose to give it powers for those purposes 
[and] no others."105 The national government could not legitimately 
"adopt any general system, because it would have embraced objects on 
which this association had no right to form or declare a will. " 106 
Likewise, Jefferson denounced the view that deposing the King had 
thrust America back into a state of nature. He objected to this "Vermont 
100. MORGAN, supra note 89, at 263. 
IOI. Id. 
102. See GORDON s. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 320 
(1992). 
103. THOMAS JEFFERSON, FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS (1801), reprinted in THE 
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 290, 292 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975). 
104. See supra Part II. 
105. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 18, 1799), in THE 
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 103, at 479, 482. 
106. Id. 
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doctrine," according to which the people of Vermont claimed that the 
Revolution had freed them from Massachusetts by returning everyone to 
a state of nature; he denied that "on changing the form of our 
government all our laws were dissolved, and ourselves reduced to a state 
of nature."101 The removal of the sovereign, King George, did not 
impinge on other items on which the people had agreed when they made 
the social contract: "For my part, if the term social contract is to be 
forced from theoretical into practical use, I shall apply it to all the laws 
obligatory on the [S]tate, and which may be considered as contracts to 
which all the individuals are parties."108 The abrogation of certain 
articles of the contract, he contended, did not render the others invalid. 109 
Jefferson's denial that the Revolution abolished all "municipal laws" 
provided an acknowledgement of the authority of the various municipal 
entities to make those laws,110 an acknowledgement that Rousseau could 
not have made. It also amounted to a tacit statement that theories about 
a state of nature would not easily be manipulated into justifications for 
the rights of individuals to begin making all social arrangements anew; 
those individuals were still fixed within their various regulating bodies 
and they were not going to escape merely because Americans had 
deposed the King. 111 
John Adams argued still more vigorously that the nation's authority 
had to be reposed in local bodies.112 The Frenchman Turgot had 
criticized America for following English custom in dividing power 
among various organs of govemment.113 French doctrine required a 
107. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph (Feb. 15, 1783), in 6 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 21 MAY 1781 TO 1 MARCH 1784, at 246, 247 (Julian P. 
Boyd ed., 1952). 
108. Id. at 248. 
109. See id. 
110. Id. 
111. Cf SHAIN, supra note 14, at 95. Barry Shain argues that in late eighteenth-
century America "autonomy and self-government were goals most appropriate to 
communities, or at the very minimum, to the family. They were clearly not appropriate 
goals for individuals." Id. He also asserts that "Revolutionary-era Americans' distrust 
of the socially unbounded individual is further evidenced in their attitude toward the 
self." Id. at 100. 
112. See generally JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENSE OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITIJTIONS, 
reprinted in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 105 (George A. Peek, Jr. ed., 
1954). 
113. Turgot was famous for his condemnation of associations in France. See 2 
OTTO GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY: 1500 TO 1800, at 166 
(Ernest Barker trans., 1958). 
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unitary authority. 11 ' But where was this authority to be found, Adams 
wondered? The theory was nonsensical, he maintained: "It is easily 
understood how all authority may be collected into 'one center' in a 
despot or monarch; but how it can be done when the center is to be the 
nation is more difficult to comprehend."11 ' 
Adams believed that Turgot was identifying the nation with its 
representative assembly and hence elevating the representative above the 
constituent. Was the Frenchman asserting that the nation's "assembly 
should be the center in which all the authority was to be collected and 
should be virtually deemed the nation?"11 ' Adams thought so. He 
devoted an entire work to refuting what seemed to him a dangerous 
doctrine. 117 It would not do to identify the constituency with a majority 
of its representatives; the way to avoid that identification was to preserve 
the integrity of the various bodies that composed the nation. 
If we imagine Adams responding directly to Rousseau, he would have 
explained that sovereign actors must tell the authors what to write. The 
doctrine of federalism, which preserved the powers of the states and in 
its extreme form even made them supreme over the national 
government, was the most forceful expression of this belief. Although 
such a theory is not a call for the kind of general incorporation that was 
to sweep the nation in the nineteenth century, it could easily become 
one. 
D. The General Will and the Municipal Association 
Indeed, it is clear that the theory went beyond a federalism that merely 
required the federal government to show respect for the states. One of 
the most notable translations of American theory into practice was the 
influence that the towns had in the years following the Revolution. The 
saga of the adoption of the Massachusetts Constitution demonstrates the 
existence of a more general rule regarding the power and authority 
wielded by smaller corporate units in dealings with larger ones. 11 ' There 
may be no finer illustration of the difference between the French and 
American scenes. These corporate bodies retained an influence out of 
proportion to their numbers and, by presuming to instruct the state 
governments, they insisted that the corporate constituent was superior to 
the representative. 11 ' In contrast to France, where the general will 
114. See supra Part II. 
115. ADAMS, supra note 112, at 123. 
116. Id. at 124-25. 
117. See id. 
118. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. 
119. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text. 
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created the corporation, the opposite was true in America. 120 
Equality of representation was one issue on which the towns showed 
their power. The commitment to equality of representation on an 
individual basis, which was overriding in France, did not dominate the 
American scene.121 Thus, when the Legislature of Massachusetts 
authored its constitution at the end of the I 770s, the question arose as to 
how an equitable representation might be achieved. The state 
convention explicitly denounced a plan that would ignore traditional 
corporate rights, giving equal weight to each person. Corporate towns 
already in existence would have to be represented: 
Representation ought to be founded on the Principle of equality; but it cannot be 
understood thereby that each Town in the Commonwealth shall have Weight 
and importance in a just proportion to its Numbers and property. An exact 
Representation would be unpracticable even in a System of Government arising 
from the State of Nature, and much more so in a state already divided into 
nearly three hundred Corporations. 122 
Massachusetts was not to cast itself back into a rational pursuit of a 
perfect but impracticable justice, a pursuit that would require it to ignore 
rights that towns had acquired prescriptively. 
Even the smallest towns demanded representation, and they generally 
considered the members of the state legislature as deputies who ought to 
follow instructions. 12' Further, they explicitly denied any direct relation 
between the state government and the individual. 124 As the town of 
Lincoln contended, the State was "Constituted of a great number of 
Distinct and very unequal Corporations which Corporations are the 
Immediate Constituant part of the State and the Individuals are only the 
120. The subsequent history of the municipal corporation suggests that it did not 
maintain its constitutive integrity. As John Garvey and Rick Hills note, cities are 
generally supposed, at law, to be subordinate to the states. See GARVEY, supra note 15, 
at 225; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free 
State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 
1206-30 (1999). 
121. Equality of representation was quite important in American affairs, but it did 
not achieve the total victory that it did in France. 
122. ADDRESS OF THE CONVENTION, MARCH 1780, reprinted in THE POPULAR 
SOURCES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY: DocUMENTS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION 
OF 1780, at 434,438 (Oscar Handlin & Mary Handlin eds., 1966) [hereinafter POPULAR 
SOURCES]. 
123. See Oscar Handlin & Mary Handlin, Introduction to POPULAR SOURCES, supra 
note 122, at 42. 
124. See id. at 45. 
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Remote parts in many respects."'" This is the doctrine of federalism, but 
applied against the state government by the smaller municipal 
corporations. It mirrors arguments made on behalf of state governments 
that the national government should not interfere directly in the affairs of 
the individuals who live in the states. 126 
The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution recognized the entitlements 
claimed by the towns, providing for compromise in the question of 
apportionment but reserving to the towns the right to amend in the 
future. 127 The constitution went further still, tacitly likening 
Massachusetts itself to the smaller corporations within it. Government 
was nothing more than "a voluntary association of individuals: ... a 
social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, 
and each citizen with the whole peog,le, that all shall be governed by 
certain laws for the common good." ' In this respect the corporation 
was quite similar to the State-it was merely a voluntary association of 
individuals. This fundamental likeness between the corporation and the 
government was to unleash, in the following century, such furious 
corporate activity as the world had never before seen. 
IV. INCORPORATION AFTER THE REVOLUTION AND THE CHURCHES 
The Revolution had barely ended when the demand for private 
incorporation began to explode."' In the years to come the presumptive 
legitimacy of the public corporation also attached itself to the private 
association. The state legislatures, which now held exclusive rights to 
incorporate, a power once held by the monarch, handed out corporate 
charters with abandon. "0 
125. Id. ( emphasis added). 
126. Thus Madison, in listing objections to the Constitution, noted the fear that the 
federal government would govern the people in the states directly: "This one tells us that 
the proposed Constitution ought to be rejected, because it is not a confederation of the 
States, but a government over individuals." THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 237 (James 
Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1964). 
127. See Handlin & Handlin, supra note 123, at 50. The constitution struck a 
balance between individual and town representation on this point. The vote to amend 
appears to have required a two-thirds vote by the population of the state. The voters 
were to be convened, in the first place, according to the towns they lived in. 
Representatives of the towns were to do the actual business of amending. See THE 
CONSTITUTION OF 1780, reprinted in POPULAR SOURCES, supra note 122, at 441,471. 
128. THE CONSTITUTION OF I 780, supra note 127, at 441. 
129. See OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE 
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN EcONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861, at 
106-33 (1969); Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation, 
50 WM. & MARY Q. 51, 51 (1993). 
130. See Maier, supra note 129, at 5 I. Gordon Wood notes that the numbers of 
charters issued rose at a very high rate: 
The states issued 11 charters of incorporation between 1781 and 1785, 22 more 
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Why did this happen? As Pauline Maier observes, this is "[o]ne of the 
great unanswered questions about the American Revolution." 131 There 
are undoubtedly several reasons, but one is the American fondness for 
association coupled with an attachment to the principles of federation, 
which led increasingly to the exercise of public powers by corporate 
bodies that were not themselves governments.132 To put it another way, 
the spirit of the Massachusetts town became the spirit of the nation.133 
Private groups came to wield enormous power in part because the 
government was unable to wield them effectively, and in part because 
they seemed to have a greater entitlement. Thus, just as the state 
governments passed on the business of business to the corporation, so 
they passed the businesses of education and religion to corporations as 
well. 
Though American culture is famous for its individualism, the most 
notable feature of the American landscape after the Revolution is the 
emergence of societies. The first enterprises dedicated to improvements 
in farming, each styled the "Society for the Promotion of Agriculture," 
were founded in South Carolina, New York, Massachusetts, and 
Connecticut between 1785 and 1792.134 In 1787 the "Philadelphia 
between 1786 and 1790, and 114 between 1791 and 1795. Between 1800 and 
I 8 I 7 they granted nearly 1,800 corporate charters. Massachusetts alone had 
[30] times more business corporations than the half dozen or so that existed in 
all of Europe. 
WOOD, supra note 102, at 321. 
131. Maier, supra note 129, at 51. 
132. Maier mentions a very similar explanation, without endorsing it: 
For contemporaries, the proliferation of corporations could signal, in effect, an 
extension of American federalism down into day-to-day, local associational 
relationships, so that "the whole political system" was "made up of a 
concatenation of various corporations, political, civil, religions, social and 
economical," in which the nation itself was a "great corporation, 
comprehending all others." 
Id. at 82 (quoting Corporations, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICA 547, 547 (F. Lieber ed., 
1836)). 
133. Maier argues that Massachusetts was exemplary in its treatment of the 
corporation. "If there is a key to the corporation's popularity, it must lie in the history of 
New England and particularly of Massachusetts." Id. at 53. While this Article agrees 
that Massachusetts was very important-as the treatment of the Massachusetts towns 
indicates-the example of the churches, discussed infra Part IV, argues that 
Massachusetts by itself cannot explain the remarkable American attitude toward 
corporate entities. 
134. J. FRANKLIN JAMESON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION CONSIDERED AS A SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT 51 (1940). 
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Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons" was founded. 135 
Many other little societies dedicated to undeniably social causes sprang 
up, even though they did not call themselves "societies"; eight years 
after the end of the war the number of colleges in the country had nearly 
doubled, from nine to seventeen.136 
Most importantly, Americans formed religious societies. Churches 
led the way in the move from incorporation by special charter to general 
incorporation. The first general incorporation act was passed in South 
Carolina in 1778, the next in New York in 1784, and another in 
Pennsylvania in 1791.137 General incorporation for businesses did not 
come until later."' New York provides an instructive contrast between 
the business and the church corporation because, even as late as 1821, 
the state constitution permitted incorporation for non-religious purposes 
only after a two-thirds vote of each house. 139 
The history of church incorporation also reveals some of the most 
important ways in which political theory has connected with legal reality 
in the United States. The churches provide a direct comparison with 
France. Their experience affords microcosmic views of the legal and 
constitutional problems still to be faced by the young nation. Was the 
country going to be run on the basis of aristocratic or democratic 
principles?"" What was the proper extent of religious freedom, and how 
was it to be implemented? These questions were faced by the national 
and state governments, and by the religious corporations as well. 
The issue of church incorporation also reminds us that the meaning of 
the constitutional guarantees respecting freedom of religion were not 
nearly as settled at the time of the Founding as we are inclined to 
believe."' By comparing the moral issues of religion with the legal 
question of incorporation, the religious example helps us understand the 
bounds of freedom and diversity in the new republic. A constitutional 
135. Id. at 76. 
136. See id. at 82-83. 
137. See William G. McLoughlin, The Role of Religion in the Revolution: Liberty of 
Conscience and Cultural Cohesion in the New Nation, in ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 197, 215-16, 235, 243-44 (Stephen G. Kurtz & James H. Hutson eds., 
1973). 
138. See WOOD, supra note 102, at 321; McLoughlin, supra note 137, at 244. 
139. See Maier, supra note 129, at 76. 
140. For the argument that corporations were aristocratic and hence at odds with the 
nation's democratic ethos, see id. at 61-62, 66-68. 
141. For a prominent statement of the belief that the Founders and contemporary 
religious sects favored religious exemptions, and that therefore the Constitution should 
be construed to favor exemptions, see generally Michael W. McConnell, The Origins 
and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 
(1990). For an alternative statement of the history of the First Amendment religion 
clauses, see generally Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious 
Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992). 
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commitment to freedom of conscience and disestablishment left many 
practical legal issues unresolved. Should denominations be allowed to 
incorporate? Should they want to incorporate? If religions were to 
become corporations, who would be the incorporators? Would 
management of these corporations be monarchic, aristocratic, or 
democratic? 
More generally, the problem posed by the churches demonstrates that 
in these early republican days Americans sought to vindicate the most 
important of their rights not as individuals, but as groups. The history of 
the churches provides a clear example of the tendency of American 
society to use the corporation as the primary vehicle to realize public 
goods, and they remind us that scores of organizations of all kinds were 
coming into being at the same time. The universities and colleges that 
began to crowd the American landscape, many of them representative of 
denominational aspirations, 142 as well as myriad business ventures and a 
host of other associations, all serve as evidence of this instinct to 
associate. 
Finally, given the inevitable desire to generalize American legal 
experience, it is essential to note that diversity of response was a 
distinctive feature of American attempts to respond to the problems 
presented by religious freedom. Federalism required that the states 
remain free to devise their own solutions to the problems posed by 
religious liberty, for the First Amendment bound only the national 
government. Although state constitutions commonly promised religious 
freedom, they did not typically explain just what that entailed. Thus, a 
diversity of responses was inevitable almost from the start. 
A. Virginia Rejects Incorporation 
The first issue to be addressed in the incorporation controversy was 
whether to allow incorporation of religions at all. Virginia, which had 
an established Anglican Church until the Revolution, is the state whose 
approach to religion was most French. 143 In 1776 the Legislature began 
142. For a perceptive evaluation of the spread of the college as an instance of 
American localism, see DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL 
EXPERIENCE 160 (1965) ("The distinctively American college was neither public nor 
private, but a community institution. In America it was of a piece with the community 
emphasis which already distinguished our civilization."). 
143. This Article focuses on several states as a representative sample: Virginia, 
Massachusetts, and New York. It also makes passing reference to other states. 
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to debate the issue of disestablishment; by 1 779 the Anglican Church 
had lost the right to tax in support of ministers. 144 A statute of 1784 
allowed the incorporation of denominations but it was repealed in 
1786. "' The An?.lican Church-now the Episcopalian Church-lost its 
legal personality. 46 
There were two arguments against incorporation: First, that the State 
did not have the authority to grant privileges to particular 
denominations, even if the privileges were made widely available."' 
Second, voluntary organizations such as religious groups did not need 
state recognition. 148 The opponents of incorporation, notably the 
Baptists, sought not only to prevent the future evils that they believed 
would result from incorporation but to make up for those from the past 
as well. 
Disestablishment was just a happy first step for those subscribing to 
either of these arguments, and critics of the Anglican supremacy insisted 
that the church should not be left in possession of property that it had 
received from the colonial government before the Revolution. 149 One 
petition insisted that the lands 
which were procured at the expense of the Community in general, appears to us 
ought to be considered under our present happy constitution, as the Publicks at 
large and as Such ought to be put to any use ... that our Honorable Legislature 
Shall think proper, to promote the wellfare of this State.150 
In 1802, the petitioners got their wish when the Legislature deprived 
the Episcopal Church of its glebe lands."' The constitutionality of the 
act was affirmed in 1802, albeit by the barest of margins."' Virginia had 
144. See McLoughlin, supra note 137, at 218. 
145. See id. at 233. 
146. See id. at 233-34. 
147. McLoughlin writes that 
it is not surprising that radical pietists and deists saw in a general-incorporation 
system precisely the same specter of state encroachment upon religious liberty 
and the beginnings of a new league between rulers and priests; they did not 
believe that incorporation was permissible even upon individual choice. No 
religious group had the right to enslave itself to or seek special privileges from 
the [S]tate. 
Id. at 232. 
148. See id. at 233. 
149. See id. 
150. H.J. EcKENRODE, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA 122 (1910). 
151. See id. at 147; McLoughlin, supra note 137, at 233-34. The church was 
allowed to keep lands obtained since 1777. See ECKENRODE, supra note 150, at 148. 
152. Chancellor George Wythe dismissed a request for injunctive relief against the 
operation of the act, and the case was appealed. Edmund Pendleton, noted for his 
support of the church, died shortly before the case was decided, and the court was 
deadlocked, two to two. Thus Wythe's decision stood. See EcKENRODE, supra note 150, 
at 148-49 (discussing Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call.) 113 (1804)). 
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followed the French example insofar as deprivation of property was 
concerned. 
Yet the state did not follow the French further. Virginia did not, like 
France, claim a general superintendency over the religious affairs of the 
disestablished church or of any other church."' Instead it showed that 
American constitutional doctrine could create real difficulties for the 
very societies it intended to help. 
By following an early and severe version of the state action doctrine, 
Virginia made church societies in general unknown to the law. The state 
would not endorse any religion, and it left the authority of their church 
governments entirely dependent on the voluntary obedience of church 
members. 154 This suited the Baptists, who were known as 
"voluntaryists"; that is, they thought that membership in a church and 
adherence to a faith should be completely voluntary matters in which the 
governments, and their courts, should not be permitted to meddle."' 
Other denominations were not as happy with the denial of 
incorporation. The Episcopal Church found not only that it had been 
deprived of the property at issue in its contest with the Baptists, but that 
in the process it had become virtually unknown to the law. Thus in 
Turpin v. Locket,"' which upheld the dispossession of church lands, 
Chancellor Tucker reasoned that "ecclesiastical corporations," which 
had been created to support the establishment of religion, no longer 
existed after disestablishment. 157 In Selden v. Overseers of the Poor,"' 
which once more upheld the confiscation of the lands, he again declared 
that Virginia's Episcopal Church was not a corporation."• 
153. See McLoughlin, supra note 137, at 234. Virginia simply left religious 
societies unknown to the law, and its position "left that state out of the mainstream of 
American religious development despite its pioneering efforts in establishing the free 
exercise of religion." Id. 
154. See id. at 233-34. 
155. McLaughlin points out that New England's Baptists, unlike those of Virginia, 
were sharply divided on the issue of "voluntaryism." See id. at 237-42. 
156. 10 Va. (6 Call.) 113 (1804). 
I 57. He wrote that "ecclesiastical corporations ... being erected for the purpose of 
perpetuating the rights of the established church, must be presumed to have ceased, as 
soon as that constitution was established, which did not admit of any establishment of 
religion in Virginia." Id. at 133. 
158. 38 Va. (11 Leigh) 127 (1840). 
159. In deciding the case in the lower court of chancery, Tucker declared: 
And here ... it is to be observed, that the Church of England, (and, a fortiori, 
the Episcopal [C]hurch in Virginia) is not, and never was a common law 
corporation. The Church of England is not degraded to the rank of a 
corporation-it is one of the estates of the realm. A bishop, or a parson, is a 
131 
Then he noted the consequence of the incorporeal character of the 
Episcopal Church on its hierarchy-it no longer existed. "[W]e may 
venture to ask-'How came Virginia by a bishop?' The answer is, 'She 
has none.' By courtesy, indeed, certain eminent divines, selected, and so 
styled by their brethren, are denominated bishops; but legally speaking 
we have none.''1w The church could have no more power, that is, than 
courtesy would afford it: "Their only power is in the voluntary 
submission of the members of their society; their only authority is 
derived from the regulation of conventions; (bodies equally unknown to 
the law with themselves;) ... .'' 161 
Lack of a corporate status also presented a grave obstacle to Catholic 
worship, if only because the unincorporated body could not easily hold 
property and pass it on. Another case involved an attempt by a man 
named Joseph Gallego to create a trust for the construction of a Catholic 
Church in Richmond. 162 The trust was held invalid because the identities 
of the beneficiaries of the trust were uncertain. 163 As Virginia's Court of 
Appeals explained, gifts to an unincorporated beneficiary were gifts to 
no one. 164 Tucker noted that "as the society or congregation is not 
incorporated, it may well be asked, who are to be regarded as the 
beneficiaries entitled to the advantage of this bequest? Who can present 
himself as a claimant of this aid designed for the roman catholic 
religion? ... Who indeed, constitute the society?"165 
Given that the answers to these questions must always be indefinite, 
he concluded that "there cannot be a trust without a cestui que trust; and 
if it cannot be ascertained who the cestui que trust is, it is the same thing 
corporation, says Mr. Blackstone, but the church is not. 
CASES ON CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., 
1952) (quoting BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE 
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GoVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND 
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 472 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, Birch & 
Snell 1803)). 
160. Id. at 17. 
161. Id. at 18. 
162. See Gallego v. Attorney Gen., 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 450 (1832), overruled by 
Protestant Episcopal Educ. Soc'y v. Churchman, 80 Va. 718 (1885). 
163. See id. at 462. 
164. See id. at 450. 
165. Id. at 466. Judge Carr agreed: 
The bare statement seems sufficient to shew, that under the general rule ... 
these would be void. Who are the beneficiaries? [T]he roman catholic 
congregation residing in Richmond. And who are they? Suppose you name 
them to-day: are those the same persons who constituted the congregation 
yesterday? [O)r who will constitute it to-morrow? Will none remove from, or 
come to Richmond, to reside? Will none be converted to or from the roman 
catholic religion? 
Id. at 461 -62. 
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as if there was none."",. Virginia's refusal to allow incorporation had 
obviously created difficulties for any churches that might have wanted to 
come to court to have their disputes settled. The people of Virginia had 
put a firm wall of separation between church and state. 167 
B. New York and Massachusetts Say "Yes" 
Remaining unknown to the law was one way to handle religious 
freedom and disestablishment, but it would not suit denominations in 
other states. One reason, already obvious, is that many clergy could not 
long have remained content with the kind of thinking that held that 
Virginia had no Bishop except by courtesy. Additionally, churches held 
property-property that would come under attack from outside the 
church and come into dispute within. The question of who owned the 
property could be answered much more certainly when the church was 
incorporated. 
In 1784, New York passed an act allowing general incorporation. 168 
The statute, besides allowing men to incorporate freely for religious 
purposes, also provided for the assignment of church property to lay 
trustees."' This provision was repeated in a statute of 1813.170 The 
reason that the property was commended to the care of lay trustees was 
to ensure that the hierarchy of the churches could not wrest ultimate 
control of the church away from the parishioners."' This assignment of 
property was the direct expression of the close connection that early 
Americans saw between civil and religious liberty. It was a literal 
translation of Locke's insistence that the powers of government are held 
166. Id. at 466. Likewise, Judge Carr added: "For it is to the roman catholic 
congregation for the time being, that the legacies are given." Id. at 462. 
167. This Article does not endorse the idea that Jefferson's "wall of separation" 
metaphor is the only metaphor by which to interpret the First Amendment. That is a 
controversial subject, and although the incorporation debate is relevant, thorough 
treatment would require an entire piece. For the argument that the United States 
Supreme Court adopted Jefferson's view too blithely, see GARVEY, supra note 15, at 
139-54; MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND 
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CoNSflTIJTIONAL HlsrORY 6-7 (1965). 
168. See HOWE, supra note 167, at 45; McLoughlin, supra note 137, at 234-35. 
169. See PAfRICK J. DIGNAN, A HlsrORY OF THE LEGAL lNCORPORAflON OF 
CATHOLIC CHURCH PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1784-1932), at 52-53 (1935); 
McLoughlin, supra note 137, at 234. 
170. See DIGNAN, supra note 169, at 64. 
171. As Archbishop Marechal reported in 1818, the property arrangements 
established by law led American Catholics "to believe that they also have the right to 
elect and dismiss their pastors as they please." Id. at 108-09. 
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only in trust. Like their counterparts in secular governments, clergy 
would have to secure the consent of their people if they were to continue 
as governors in their churches. Their inability to control the property of 
the churches would prevent them from abusing their positions of trust. 
Massachusetts also settled on incorporation as a solution to the 
problems posed by religious liberty, although Massachusetts, with its 
domestic congregational establishment, did not proceed through exactly 
the same steps as New York. Congregational churches were established 
in each town; that is, the boundaries of the parish and the town were 
coextensive and tax monies-called a "general assessment"-were paid 
to the town's parish. 112 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 
provided that the assessment could be paid to whichever religion 
commanded a majority in the town, as well as to any churches deciding 
to incorporate."' Thus Massachusetts used tax monies to support 
religion, but in the wake of the Revolution it made the revenues 
available to a broader range of denominations. 
Incorporation thus represented the first attempt by Massachusetts to 
accommodate the demands of religious tolerance. The next issue was 
how to address the circumstances of non-incorporating denominations 
such as the Baptists. In 1810 the Supreme Judicial Court made clear that 
unincorporated denominations could not avail themselves of the 
assessments. 174 "If the construction which was contended for was right, 
then a Roman Catholic teacher might maintain an action similar to the 
plaintiff's."175 In Barnes v. First Parish, 116 the court explained that "the 
constitution has not provided in any way for the legal support of any 
teacher of piety, religion, and morality, unless he be a public Protestant 
teacher of some incorporated religious society." 177 Later on, in line with 
the intention of an act of 1811, the court decided that unincorporated 
religious societies could also avail themselves of the tax exemption.178 In 
1824 the Religious Liberty Act ended the general assessment and 
replaced it with a completely voluntary system of general 
172. See McLoughlin, supra note 137, at 226-30, 236-37. 
173. See id. at236-37. 
174. See Barnes v. First Parish. 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 401 (1810). "For, although the 
constitution contemplates different denominations of Protestant Christians. yet no 
religious societies are referred to, unless incorporated; and no teachers are mentioned as 
existing, who are not entitled to a maintenance." Id. at 413. 
175. Id.at4!3-14. 
176. 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 401 (1810). 
177. Id. at 412. 
178. See Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. ( 13 Tyng) 340 ( 1817). The statute of 1811 now 
"puts corporate and unincorporated societies upon the same footing, and makes no 
distinction between such as have an ordained minister specially settled over them, and 
such as are occasionally taught by preachers who may be ordained at large, or as 
ministers of other parishes." Id. at 344. 
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In the years following the American Revolution, the general 
incorporation of religious denominations found approval as a means of 
answering the difficult questions related to establishment and free 
exercise. Virginia was an exception. Its disapproval of formal 
incorporation, however, did not signal that the state disapproved of 
associations as such, or of religious associations in particular. Virginia's 
denial of corporate status reflected a belief that voluntary associations, in 
order to be truly voluntary, could not be state-supported. It did not 
represent the hostility toward associations and corporations that was felt 
by Rousseau and his intellectual heirs. 
The early years of religious incorporation, if the field is surveyed 
broadly, gave a ringing affirmation of the role that corporations and 
associations could play in resolving thorny public issues. The 
experience of the churches demonstrates that disestablishment in the 
United States, which was going to be a federated process simply by 
virtue of dual federalism, was hyper-federated. It also serves as a 
caution against facile assertions that American society and the law were 
supremely individualist in the years after the Revolution. 
V. THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF THE CORPORATION AND THE 
ACCOMMODATION TO GROUP PERSONALITY 
To state the achievement of the corporate solution in another way, it 
allowed important public purposes to be addressed by society, or 
societies, thus avoiding the joint dangers of individualism and being co-
opted by government. In this sense incorporation provided a solution to 
one of the most vexing problems that had been posed by antifederalists: 
The United States was too big to have a government "of the people." 
Anitfederalist Richard Henry Lee, writing as "The Federal Farmer," 
insisted in 1787 that fair representation required "that every order of 
men in the community ... can have a share in it."180 The republic, he 
contended, was too big too allow such extensive representation. 181 
Madison's famous response was The Federalist No. 10, in which he 
argued that the vast extent of the nation would actually represent a 
179. See McLoughlin, supra note 137, at 242. 
180. [Richard Henry Lee], Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, 
Letter II (October 9, 1787), reprinted in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 
269, 269 (Leonard Kriegel ed., 1964). 
18 I. See id. at 269-70. 
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greater number of interests: "Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater 
variety of parties and interests .... "182 His solution was to increase the 
number of groups so as to encourage a multiplicity of interests, which is 
just what the newly-incorporated churches were preparing to do as the 
nineteenth century progressed. 
It is not too much to say that incorporation led to the invention of a 
new type of legal personality. States could play some role in the 
maintenance of religious belief while avoiding, or appearing to avoid, 
any interference with religious freedom. For the most part, the various 
denominations, though insistent that they depended on the voluntary 
adherence of their followers, also wanted this state recognition. That is 
to say that they wanted their moral personalities translated into legal 
personality. 
As the experience of the churches suggests, this recognition required 
compromise, so that the corporate enterprise should not deviate far from 
American ways. In some respects, the most interesting feature of the 
incorporation of churches is the way in which the legal systems of the 
states made way for what we might call a "moral constitution," 
expressed in a set of beliefs about what distinguished a good corporation 
from a bad one. Should a corporation, for example, be ruled by one 
person, by a few, or by many? As time passed, the rules governing the 
"moral constitution" evolved, and the new moral personalities pushed 
themselves on the states in a way that the individual could not. 
From this vantage point, the religious corporations provide a concrete 
illustration of Tocqueville's observations on the importance of 
association in American society. The principle of association had 
replaced the niche once occupied by privileged orders in Europe. In 
America, the corporation was expected to offer the moral sustenance to 
the nation that had been the business of the aristocracy in Europe. 
A. Majority Rule 
One of the first questions faced by the church societies was also faced 
by the governments at the same time: Who should govern? From the 
first, an important feature of a properly-constituted corporation in the 
early republic was that it should not be ruled by one person, whether 
king or minister. Madison stated this presumptive rule by questioning 
the wisdom of the ancients when they allowed individuals to govern. In 
one passage of The Federalist he observed: 
It is not a little remarkable that in every case reported by ancient history, in 
182. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 61 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1964). 
136 
[VOL. 37: IOI, 2000] Corporation in American Law 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
which government has been established with deliberation and consent, the task 
of framing it has not been committed to an assembly of men, but has been 
performed by some individual citizen of preeminent wisdom and approved 
integrity. 183 
Concluding that it was undesirable for a people to "so far abandon the 
rules of caution as to place their destiny in the hands of a single 
citizen,"184 Madison argued that his contemporaries should "admire the 
improvement made by America on the ancient mode of preparing and 
establishing regular plans of government."'" 
A similar rule prohibiting any individual from holding extensive 
powers of government was applied to the governance of religious 
societies as well. 186 Thus, as noted above, the property of incorporated 
churches typically had to be held by a number of trustees. 187 As a 
modem scholar can see, this was not a rule of nature, but it was very 
similar to the rule of government that Locke had devised by ruminating 
about life in a state of nature. 188 Because the people were the ones who 
I 83. THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 233 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1964). 
184. Id. at 234. 
185. Id. at 235. This point was preliminary to the central purpose of The Federalist 
No. 38, which was to argue that, just as Americans ought to learn from the mistakes of 
the ancients, so they should avail themselves of the lessons that their experience under 
the Articles of Confederation would teach them about their own mistakes. See id. at 
233-42. 
186. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. 
I 87. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. 
188. This characterization is supplied by Philip Hamburger, who distinguishes 
between natural law as "traditional right reason" and natural law as "a mode of reasoning 
about the liberty of individuals in the state of nature." Philip A. Hamburger, Revolution 
and Judicial Review: Chief Justice Holt's Opinion in City of London v. Wood, 94 
COLUM. L. REv. 2091, 2121 (1994). 
This description of Locke's natural law reasoning is important because it distinguishes 
between natural law considered in terms of substantive rules of justice, and natural law 
considered in procedural terms. Hamburger points to a procedural role as one of the 
most important that Locke furnished: That in civil society no one could be judge in his 
own cause. See id. at 2121, 2134-36. From this procedural entitlement, according to 
Hamburger, Locke derived a rudimentary theory of judicial review: "On this basis, 
numerous writers, most notably Locke, reasoned further that if a dispute arose between a 
people and their government, the latter could not decide between them, for it could not 
be judge in its own case." Id. at 2122. 
The distinction is crucial in modem law in areas such as voting rights, in which 
fundamental disagreements often stem from differences, as Larry Alexander has put it, 
between those who advocate "a substantive conception of democracy" and those who 
champion "a procedural conception of democracy." Larry Alexander, Still Lost in the 
Political Thicket ( or Why I Don't Understand the Concept of Vote Dilution), 50 VAND. 
L. REV. 327, 329 (1997). One of the lessons of the early church experience is that the 
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actually created the nation's wealth, they were entitled to withhold it 
from a leader who was violating his public trust. It would be 
incongruous to permit one person to be able to run the congregation's 
affairs without accountability. The legislatures were saying, in effect, 
that monarchy was no more legitimate in church government than in 
secular government, and they were generally happy to impose this belief 
as a rule of law. 
Originally, the prescribed form of government was aristocratic rather 
than democratic. Control of the property of a given parish was vested in 
trustees and not in the whole body of the congregation. Over time, 
however, there was relentless pressure to extend control in democratic 
fashion. This happened in Massachusetts through judicial construction 
of the Constitution of 1780 in Baker v. Fales,"' decided in 1820. The 
Supreme Judicial Court refused to restore "to the churches the power 
they once enjoyed, of electing the minister without concurrence of the 
people or congregation. "190 It was "not at all consistent with the spirit of 
the times, that the great majority should ... be subject to the minority."'" 
The court, although sensible that religion presented a special legal 
problem, operated on a premise of majority rule drawn from political 
philosophy and consonant with "the spirit of the times," but one that was 
nowhere explicitly written in law. 
Likewise, whereas the trustee system of New York began on a quasi-
aristocratic basis, by the middle of the century the New York Court of 
Appeals construed incorporation statutes of 1784 and 1813 to increase 
the power of the conr,egation at the expense of the trustees. In 
Robertson v. Bullions,' 2 the court decided that the members of the 
congregation were in fact incorporated and the trustees were merely "the 
managing officers of the corporation."'" "These officers," declared the 
court, "are trustees, in the same sense with the president and directors of 
a bank, or of a railroad company."194 Religious societies were "not to be 
regarded as ecclesiastical corporations, in the sense of the English law, 
which were composed entirely of ecclesiastical persons . . . but as 
belonging to the class of civil corporations to be controlled and managed 
according to the principles of the common law."'" According to the 
two conceptions of justice are often intertwined. Procedural allocations may 
discriminate against denominations with doctrinal commitments that are inconsistent 
with the initial allocations. 
189. 16 Mass. (15 Tyng) 488 (1820). 
190. Id. at 521. 
191. Id. 
192. 11 N.Y. 243 (1854). 
193. Id. at 250. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 251-52. 
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court, it was the "intention of the legislature, to place the control of the 
temporal affairs of these societies in the hands of the majority of the 
incorporators, independent of ~riest or bishop, presbytery, synod, or 
other ecclesiastical judicatory."1 By statute, "the salary of the minister 
is put absolutely, and at all times, under the control of a majority of the 
congregation," not the trustees alone.197 Appointments were also 
determined by the laity: 
It would be in vain, for any donor of property or funds to the congregation, to 
prescribe the religious faith of the minister to whose support the avails should 
be devoted; for, until the salary should be fixed by a majority of the 
congregation, not one dollar of the revenues of the society could be 
appropriated by the trustees to its payment. 198 
Just as American governments had introduced safeguards to ensure 
that they would never be subject to the tyrannical rule of an individual, 
so American churches were being required to subject themselves to 
democratic precepts. Law was being fashioned to accommodate a 
democratic moral personality. 
B. Incorporation and Catholicism 
The issue of majority rule relates closely to a second important moral 
attribute of incorporation: anti-Catholicism. In McGinnis v. Watson,'99 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the course of deciding that the 
majority of a congregation could annex the church with the Associate 
Reformed Synod, declared that the State could not punish "regular and 
orderly changes in religion ... without condemning the Reformation."200 
What about a church whose express purpose was to condemn the 
Reformation? The Catholic experience of incorporation points to one of 
the peculiarities of American law in the first half of the nineteenth 
century: in many states Catholic Churches were allowed to incorporate, 
but only according to Protestant rules. 
The law was tolerant and intolerant at the same time. Catholic 
196. Id. at 263-64. The holding left church doctrine at the mercy of the majority: If 
"a trust was intended in favor of persons of a particular religious faith; then, I hold it to 
be clear, that a religious corporation in this state, can be the recipient of no such trust." 
Id. at 262-63. 
191. Id. at 263 (emphasis added). 
198. Id. 
199. 41 Pa. 9 (1861). 
200. Id. at 19. 
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congregations were allowed to worship freely in the new nation, but 
their freedom was qualified. In Massachusetts Catholic churches could 
worship but not incorporate.201 In other states, notably New York, 
Catholic churches could incorporate but were subject to the trustee 
requirement.202 This requirement, which vested control of the church's 
government in a group of laymen rather than in a member of the church 
hierarchy, was obviously antithetical to the governmental structure of the 
Catholic Church. 
This discrimination was intentional, and it led to a longstanding 
conflict. Courts in Virginia, New York, Pennsylvania, and 
Massachusetts all expressed, at one time or another, hostility toward 
Catholicism.20' The result of this hostility was a lengthy battle between 
the church hierarchy and the state legislatures.204 On many occasions, 
there were also battles between trustees and their bishops.205 The 
eventual result was an accommodation, as states began to recognize that 
the Catholic form of government required a different disposition of 
church properties. 
In 1863, New York passed a statutory amendment allowing Catholics 
to "incorporate accordingly as may be most suitable to their 
discipline."206 The amendment provided for a high degree of 
ecclesiastical control over the lay trustees and was considered a victory 
by the church. Other states followed New York's lead, and in the next 
few years Connecticut and New Jersey passed similar statutes.207 
The problem was not resolved completely, however, until 1913, when 
the Pennsylvania Legislature likewise relented to the demands of the 
church hierarchy.'°' With this statutory amendment, the long struggle 
over incorporation came to an end. It was a struggle that demonstrated 
both the capacity of the American system to tolerate diversity, and its 
rigidity as well. 
20 I. As Dignan notes, Catholics enjoyed nominal freedom in Massachusetts even 
while the Congregational churches continued to enjoy a privileged status. See DIGNAN, 
supra note 169, at 20-22. 
202. See id. at 64-66, 73-76. 
203. See id. at 64-84; see also supra notes 162-66, 175 and accompanying text; 
infra notes 210-14 and accompanying text. 
204. See id. at 67-140 (detailing the trustee controversy). 
205. See id. 
206. Id. at 207. 
207. See id. at 210. 
208. See id. at 234. 
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C. The Protestant Constitution and the Rule of 
Distinct and Independent Societies 
The dispute over Catholicism also illustrates the manner in which the 
new nation, despite its ability to accommodate diversity, was committed 
to traditional beliefs and practices. Given that the United States was 
founded on the will of the people, it was inevitable that their will would 
begin to find its way even into the laws that governed religion. It was 
inevitable that the character of American government and society would 
impress itself on the church corporations. This struggle, therefore, offers 
a good look at the group nature of the new extended polity of the United 
States. 
To many Americans at the time of the Revolution, it was obvious that 
freedom was a Protestant commodity. The Reverend Samuel West, 
mentioned above for his contention that "the collective body of the 
state" alone was entitled to determine whether a government was 
tyrannical, also contended that civil government itself was sanctioned by 
the Bible.",. After the Revolution, even those dedicated to religious 
liberty were prone to identify Protestant rules as essential rules of good 
government. 
This was made plain in debates over the 1855 passage in New York of 
an incorporation law aimed specifically at the Catholic hierarchy."0 The 
bill, which meant to ensure that bishops could not evade the trustee 
system of ownership, was supported by Senator Brooks, who professed 
it his "aim to show that the political State is Protestant in its character, if 
not in its constitution-that its Republican success has been mainly 
founded upon its Protestant religion, that other systems of faith are not in 
harmony with true civil and religious liberty."211 Though speaking many 
years after the Revolution, Brooks sounded just like preachers from 
1776. Freedom itself had a particular religious content and was thus 
inseparable from right religion. 
Quite apart from their disagreement with the Senator, Catholics made 
an extremely important observation about this species of freedom. It 
was premised on a view of popular sovereignty that centered not on the 
individual but on the group. In one New York parish, lay trustees 
209. "This account of the nature and design of civil government, which is so clearly 
suggested to us by the plain principles of common sense and reason, is abundantly 
confirmed by the sacred Scriptures .... " WEST, supra note 98, at 423. 
210. See DIGNAN, supra note 169, at 194. 
211. Id. ( citation omitted). 
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attempted to force the selection of a new priest, claiming the right to 
choose and discharge priests.m According to Father John Carroll, who 
mediated the dispute, the trustees asserted an American right of self-
government with respect to church affairs: 
I solemnly aver that those who excite these troubles maintained in my 
presence by their lawyers in a public tribunal, and upheld with all their 
might ... that all right to exercise ecclesiastical ministry was derived from the 
people . . . . Then they deny that they are or ever have been subject to my 
episcopal authority; and when the words of the Pope's brief were shown them, 
in which all the faithful in the United States are subject to the Bishop, they 
impudently dared to assail the brief as imposing a yoke on them contrary to 
American laws. 213 
This kind of thought, he asserted, threatened "the unity and catholicity of 
our Church," which would degenerate into "distinct and independent 
societies, nearly in the same manner as the congregation Presbyterians of 
our neighboring New England States."'" 
In pointing to the danger of separating into "distinct and independent 
societies," Carroll put his finger on one of the distinguishing features not 
just of New England religious life, but of American life in general: It 
was characterized not by excessive attention to the individual, but by a 
solicitude for the small group. Whether he realized it or not, he was 
taking an active part in the process of incorporation that was making 
federalism and separation of powers into a rule of American law. In 
attempting to make a place for the moral personality of his church in 
New York law, he was helping to create a nation that was itself 
composed of small nations. 
D. Alexis de Tocqueville and the Sanctity of Association 
A viam Soifer wryly notes that "[i]t is de rigeur to begin any serious 
discussion of the role of groups in America with Alexis de Tocqueville's 
observation[s]" about the part that associations played in American 
society."' This Article has put him, perversely, near the end. Yet the 
meaning of Tocqueville's analysis is often overlooked, as Soifer notes, 
in favor of disputes over vague notions of "communal versus 
individualistic values."216 It may be that placing him after the discussion 
of church corporations will help focus his remarks. 
The story of the churches certainly illustrates Tocqueville' s thesis. 
The churches provide a concrete example of the role that voluntary 
212. See id. at 74-75, 81-84. 
213. Id. at 83 ( citation omitted). 
214. Id. at 75 (citation omitted). 
215. SOIFER, supra note 7, at 32. 
216. Id. 
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associations played in the early national years of American society, as 
they show the way in which the corporate form began to move nearer to 
the heart of American law. If we attribute to these early Americans an 
obsessive, possessive individualism such as that which besets us today, 
we have missed the significance of the incorporation of the churches. 
Tocqueville did not, and for confirmation of the sanctity of 
associations in general in the early republic, we need only look through 
his eyes. Long before the end of the debate over Catholic control of 
church property, he observed that American government had handed 
over much of its business to associations, which served almost as 
competitors in the provision of the public good.217 Regretful of the 
attack mounted against tradition by the general will in his native France, 
he remarked on the essential public service done in America by 
voluntary associations."' The species of liberty that would be decried in 
the next century by Americans themselves as mere bourgeois 
individualism was seen by Tocqueville as the antithesis of individualism 
and the sine qua non of democratic freedom.21 ' 
As Tocqueville saw the issue, in the French Revolution despotism was 
the result of the assertion that the only true civic relation was that of the 
individual and the State, coupled with an insistence on equality."" The 
Revolution had destroyed all corporate pretenders to sovereignty, 
eliminating "those individual powers which were able singlehanded to 
cope with tyranny."221 The nation had, in effect, confiscated their 
powers, for "the government alone ... has inherited all the prerogatives 
snatched from families, corporations, and individuals.""' 
By contrast, wrote Tocqueville, Americans had "used liberty to 
combat the individualism born of equality, and they have won.""' Their 
liberty, which began with the freedom of the individual, found its purest 
217. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513 (J.P. Mayer ed. & 
George Lawrence trans., I 969) ("In every case, at the head of any new undertaking, 
where in France you would find the government or in England some territorial magnate, 
in the United States you are sure to find an association."). 
218. See id. at 697 ("An association, be it political, industrial, commercial, or even 
literary or scientific, is an educated and powerful body of citizens which cannot be 
twisted to any man's will or quietly trodden down, and by defending its private interests 
against the encroachments of power, it saves the common liberties."). 
219. See id. at 511. 
220. See infra notes 221-22 and accompanying text. 
221. Id. at 15. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 511. 
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expression not in the immediate relationship between the individual and 
the State, but in the practice of voluntary association. 
The spirit of association led to civic triumphs in several areas, and 
Tocqueville saw quite clearly that corporate activity was not restricted to 
one area of endeavor. He believed that one victory of the Revolution 
was recorded in the field of religion, in which America had combined 
the "two perfectly distinct elements which elsewhere have often been at 
war with one another."224 These elements were "the spirit of religion and 
the spirit of freedom."'" Tocqueville believed that such a combination 
was not possible under a government that believed that corporations 
existed only at the sufferance of the sovereign. 
In America, the liberty to be let alone was combined, via freedom of 
association, with a liberty to achieve a higher good.226 According to 
Tocqueville, though American freedom was based on the individual, it 
found social expression even outside of government.227 The political 
freedoms reminded the American "that he lives in society."228 Moreover, 
Americans learned their civic duties through a wide variety of 
associations. Political associations were "only one small part of the 
immense number of different types of associations found there."'" 
Americans of every age were "forever forming associations" of every 
kind: "religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, 
immensely large and very minute."230 
The legitimacy of these associations did not depend on the prior 
approval of the government."' Combination managed what was 
accomplished by governmentally-accorded privilege in other nations, 
and the associations allowed the de facto inequality that was no longer 
tolerable at law: "associations must take the place of the powerful 
private persons whom equality of conditions has eliminated.""' The 
224. Id. at 46. 
225. Id. at 47. 
226. For a good expos1Uon of the differences between the two liberties, see 
generally ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958), reprinted in FOUR ESSAYS 
ON LIBERTY 118 (1969). This Article does not follow Berlin in calling them "negative•• 
and "positive," mainly because there are always people willing to misunderstand the 
point that he tried to make. Subsequent commentators have found it very easy to assume 
that positive liberty is an unqualified good, and that negative liberty is, in the main, a bad 
thing. This was far from the point that he sought to establish. For his attempt to deal 
with critical commentary on the distinction, see id. at ix. 
227. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 217, at 512. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 513. 
230. Id. 
231. "In every case, at the head of any new undertaking, where in France you would 
find the government or in England some territorial magnate, in the United States you are 
sure to find an association." Id. 
232. Id. at 516. 
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American government was now dependent on the social formations that 
in theory preceded it. The theory that underlay federalism and the 
separation of powers had been extended to bodies that could not 
properly be said to be within the government. 
VI. THE CORPORATION AND MORAL PERSONALITY IN THE PRESENT 
This section explores the importance of the corporate form in modem 
law by returning to those who criticize American law for its 
individualism. There is little point in tracing the influence of the 
business corporation into the present day. No one doubts the enormous 
powers of these leviathans; to demonstrate that they receive 
extraordinary protection under American law would not speak to the 
criticisms leveled by the advocates of group protection. 
It is more to the point to understand that the powers of corporate 
entities are too often misdescribed in terms of individualism, and are too 
often justified simply by reference to their property rights. The Article 
thus addresses the modem issue in two ways: First, it shows how the 
gains made by corporations in the nineteenth century have provided for 
some extremely important but unappreciated instances of group 
protection in the twentieth century. The contention here is that 
American law actually has extraordinary tolerance for group rights and 
diversity, particularly when the group is a corporation that has dedicated 
property to sustaining a way of life that is considered compatible with 
widely shared American values. Second, the Article returns to the 
criticism of individualism leveled at American law, in order to make a 
more accurate and pointed assessment of the subject of group protection 
and its failures. Here the Article argues that the supposedly 
individualistic tendencies of the American legal system are better 
viewed as the flip side of the predisposition toward groups that are 
voluntarily assembled with property to devote a cause. In short, when 
the law appears to demonstrate an aversion to group rights, it is often 
resisting an attempt to assign people to a group without their clear 
consent and refusing to vindicate a claim that is not supported by 
property. 
A. Group Personality and the State: A Two-Way Street 
The government has made a special place for the corporate and moral 
personality of the group, a place that has been earned as the result of 
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compromise between the State and the group. The reason that the 
significance of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century moral vision of the 
corporation is not purely historical is that it shows how some of these 
compromises were struck. During this time American government and 
American corporations came to an accommodation and, as a result, a 
new kind of moral personality appeared on the legal landscape. As the 
century progressed even the business corporation came to be treated 
more often as a person at law. The most important instance of this 
tendency came in Santa Clara County v. Southern Paci.fie Railroad,"' in 
which the United States Supreme Court announced that the corporation 
was a person within the contemplation of the Fourteenth Amendment.234 
The corporate personality enjoyed an extraordinary range of 
privileges, but it was also often limited by compromises with the State. 
233. 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
234. Morton Horwitz has contended at length that the Santa Clara decision did not 
recognize the corporation as a natural entity. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 65-
107 (1992). Instead, he argues it accepted the argument that corporate interests should 
be understood as the interests of the shareholders considered individually. He points to 
jurists such as Justice Field, who had written in the California case of County of San 
Mateo v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), that "whenever a 
provision of the constitution, or of a law, guarant[e]es to persons the enjoyment of 
property ... the benefits of the provision extend to corporations, and that the courts will 
always look beyond the name of the artificial being to the individuals whom it 
represents." Id. at 744. 
Moreover, Horwitz asserts that the natural entity theory of the corporation "was not 
available at the time the case was decided," HORWITZ, supra, at 70, and was not to 
emerge until the end of the nineteenth century. See id. at 70-74. 
The most obvious flaw in this argument is that the Court in Santa Clara did actually 
rule that the corporation was a person, without offering any theoretical justification, and 
it did not explicitly maintain that the corporation merely represented the interests of the 
individuals who made it up. Beyond this, Horwitz' s argument is not exhaustive, for it 
consults only the opinions of a few jurists-who might just a few years back have been 
denounced by authors such as Horwitz as "formalists"-and the writings of some 
contemporary legal theorists. He takes no account of what was forcing the law to accord 
a brand new status to the corporation, i.e., what social phenomena were forcing the law 
into retreating from the concession theory of corporate creation. It is interesting to learn 
that the theory of the time was confined to individual property rights, but we should not 
be surprised that theory did not fully describe what the courts were actually doing. 
It is hardly surprising that judicial language did not fully express the nature of the 
claims that judicial opinions were vindicating; indeed, one of the most important of this 
Article's contentions is that, even in the present day, the courts have not found language 
that adequately explains the advantages that corporate entities enjoy under the law. In 
addition, with regard to the individual nature of the claims being sustained, Horwitz 
shows only that individual corporators were allowed to assert their rights as individuals 
in claiming on behalf of the corporation. He does not show that those rights were 
identical, or that they were assumed by the courts to be identical. 
As Garvey notes, we continue to describe corporate and other group rights as the rights 
of the individuals who compose the group, but our descriptions do not always accurately 
describe the nature of the rights we protect, or accurately identify the "person" bearing 
the rights. See GARVEY, supra note 15, at 123-28. 
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Perhaps most importantly, corporate law had to embody some of the 
precepts of American political theory, such as rules regarding 
democratic control. As Dartmouth College v. Woodward'-" showed, this 
meant that corporations, like governments themselves, originated in 
contracts.236 The effect of the decision was thus to protect the 
corporation against state intrusions, in accord with the argument that the 
colonies had used against England in the years after 1764-that a 
colonial charter was a contract between a King and his people.237 Of 
course, in this case it was the State that was bound by the democratic 
rule of governance; the trustees of the College were undoubtedly very 
happy with the result. It is hard to imagine that they felt they had been 
forced to compromise very much. 
The area of church law shows that the extension of protection to 
religious corporations was often accompanied by compromise with the 
government. Churches were forced to make some concessions to the 
character of the states and nation in which they made their claims of 
religious liberty; they had to prove, in effect, that they were sociable. As 
the dispute over the proper way to incorporate churches highlights, 
churches often had to accept rules of property ownership, and thus forms 
235. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
236. It is easy to miss the real significance of Danmouth College by fixing too 
quickly on the fact that the Court vindicated a property right, as Gerald Frug does: 
In determining where to draw the public/private distinction for 
corporations, the courts first decided what was important to protect against 
state power. In Trustees of Danmouth College v. Woodward ... the United 
States Supreme Court gave its response to this question, an answer that came 
straight from Locke: what needed protection was property. 
Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1102 (1980) 
( citation omitted). 
It is more instructive to note the kind of property right that the Court recognized, and 
the civic relations supposed and supported by this understanding. The integrity of the 
corporation was secured by the ruling, with the result that the functions performed by the 
trustees were their property. That is to say, these functions were appropriate to them, 
and were more properly exercised by them-under the terms of the charter-than by the 
State. The case is thus better seen in light of the relation between property and propriety 
that has recently been expounded by Greg Alexander and Carol Rose. See GREGORY S. 
ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 194-203 (1998); CAROL M. ROSE, "Takings" 
and the Practices of Property: Property as Wealth, Property as "Propriety, " in 
PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 49, 64 (1994). 
237. As the Handlins point out, in cases such as Dartmouth College the Court was 
adopting arguments similar to those advanced by American revolutionaries. They cite 
the Berkshire County convention in 1774: "Any franchises and liberties ... granted to a 
corporation and body politic ... cannot legally be taken from such corporations and 
bodies politic, but by their own consent or by forfeiture." HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra 
note 129, at 154. 
147 
of government, that did not comport well with their organization or 
doctrine. The sociability requirement was expressed in its most extreme 
form in Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Later-Day 
Saints v. United States,"' which upheld congressional dissolution of the 
Mormon Church corporation. One of the reasons that the dissolution 
was upheld was that polygamy was considered by many to be 
uncivilized."' Justice Bradley had no difficulty in affirming that 
Congress's action was constitutional, given that the "organization of a 
community for the sr.read and practice of polygamy is, in a measure, a 
return to barbarism." 40 Moreover, in the view of the Court the Mormons 
had distinguished themselves primarily by their lawlessness; Bradley 
referred to "the past history of the sect; to their defiance of the 
government authorities; to their attempt to establish an independent 
community; to their efforts to drive from the territory all who were not 
connected with them in communion and sympathy."241 
The message, by the end of the nineteenth century, was clear: 
compromise was essential to corporate protection. In fact, the influence 
of the compromises into which the churches and the states entered is felt 
even now by some of the churches.242 Notably, in certain respects the 
Catholic Church still feels the effects of the Protestant constitution. To 
begin with, the Roman Catholic Church as such is not known to 
American law, except in the insular possessions gained during the 
Spanish-American War.243 Thus, as one American court put it, the idea 
that the church can own property is an "inconceivable assumption."244 It 
is a sovereign power that can acquire property only "by treaty with the 
government at Washington."245 This means that in the event that 
someone makes off with some church property in the United States, the 
Pope cannot come to court to collect it. 
On the other hand, neither can lay trustees or the body of any 
238. 136 U.S. I (1890). 
239. See id. at 49. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
242. Garvey suggests that the decision in Presbyterian Church in the United States 
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), the 
effect of which "was to free congregational majorities to believe as they like," and thus 
to weaken the hierarchy's control over the church, could have a farther-reaching effect. 
GARVEY, supra note 15, at 146. 
243. See CARL ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAW 47 (1917); see also 
Santos v. Holy Roman Catholic & Apostolic Church, 212 U.S. 463, 465 (1909) 
(recognizing "the legal personality of the Roman Church"); Municipality of Ponce v. 
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, 210 U.S. 296, 322 (1908) (discussing property 
interests of Spain and the Catholic Church). 
244. ZOLLMANN, supra note 243, at 48 (quoting Bonacum v. Murphy, 104 N.W. 
180, 182 (Neb. 1905)). 
245. Id. (quoting Bonacum, 104 N.W. at 182). 
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particular congregation, for the compromise is that archbishops typically 
own church property."' Happily for the hierarchy, the property of the 
church is thus neither in lay hands nor under the control of a majority of 
each parish."' Of course, in a property contest between the Pope and his 
American bishops, it appears that American law would have to side with 
the bishops. 
The result of this compromise is privilege of a kind that is not often 
recognized. This fact calls to mind Tocqueville's observation that 
American associations were assuming the privileged position that the 
aristocracy had once held in France."' Corporations fare well in 
American law not merely because of their power, but also because of the 
presumptive legitimacy of their associative activities. 
It seems evident that such sentiments were capitalized on by the 
monstrous combinations bearing the misleading name of "trusts"-close 
relatives of the corporation. There is the example of H.H. Rogers, a 
prominent figure in the Standard Oil Trust, who gave testimony in the 
New York Legislature in 1879. When asked to explain the relation of 
the Trust to the oil refiners, Rogers spoke of a rather mystical quality 
called "harmony" and of a natural association between husband and 
wife. 249 Ninety to ninety-five percent of them, he said, were in 
"harmony" with the Trust. 
246. That is why, for example, in the famous test case of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA), City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), Archbishop 
Flores had standing to sue. 
24 7. Mere parishioners are excluded from church governance in other 
denominations, as well. In the church takings case of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City 
of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), for example, parishioners made a motion to 
intervene, and the motion was denied. The Second Circuit ruled that the denial was 
proper 
because the proposed intervenors lack[ed] any legally protectable interest in 
this matter. Under New York law, as a Protestant Episcopal Church, St. 
Bartholomew's is a corporate body placed in the trusteeship of its church 
warden and vestrymen. To the extent that the proposed intervenors are 
members of the parish, they enjoy only the right to vote in the election of the 
church wardens and vestrymen. Thus, the Rector, Wardens and Members of 
the Vestry is the proper party to litigate the constitutionality of encumbrances 
placed on Church property. 
Id. at 360 (citations omitted). 
248. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 217, at 516 ("Among democratic peoples 
associations must take the place of the powerful private persons whom equality of 
conditions has eliminated."). 
249. See DANIEL J. BOORS TIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 417-
18 (1973). 
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Q. When you speak of their being in harmony with the Standard, what do you 
mean by that? ... 
A. If I am in harmony with my wife, I presume I am at peace with her, and am 
working with her. 
Q. You are married to her, and you have a contract with her? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that what you mean? 
A. Well, some people live in harmony without being married. 
Q. Without having a contract? 
A. Yes; I have heard so.250 
After being pressed further on the details of the union, Rogers asked 
"Well, is it a railroad abuse, or is it an abuse to be in harmony with 
people?""' This was a very embarrassing question to ask of a 
government that was itself, in theory, based on voluntary association. It 
was also a question designed to play on the notion that harmonious 
relations leading to property acquisition do not depend on government 
approval for their legitimacy. 252 
At the time of Rogers's testimony, of course, the trusts were seeking 
to avoid legal recognition rather than receive it. Nonetheless, they help 
make the point that because associating was assumed to be the thing that 
people should be doing even in the absence of government, associations 
should at the least not be hindered by government. 
B. The Corporation: Don't Come to Court Without It 
Why is this long tradition of group protection in the United States not 
more widely recognized? There are two reasons. First, it may be that 
even if the law often vindicates the rights of the group, it does so only if 
it can articulate those rights in terms of individual property rights. This 
seems to be what Glendon has in mind when she maintains that the 
residents of Poletown were unable to express how their shared interests 
differed from their individual property rights,"' and what Horwitz means 
in denying that late nineteenth-century cases relied on an entity theory of 
corporate rights.254 In other words, where we might expect to see a group 
right, instead we see only the same old property right. Gerald Frug 
explained the outcome of Dartmouth College in this way: 
250. Id. at 418. 
251. Id. ( emphasis added). 
252. In this regard, note the assertion made in the Massachusetts Constitution that 
government was nothing more than "a voluntary association of individuals ... a social 
compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with 
the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good." li!E 
CONSTITUTION OF 1780, supra note 127, at 441. 
253. See GLENDON, supra note I, at 110-11. 
254. See HORWITZ, supra note 234, at 65- 107. 
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In detennining where to draw the public/private distinction for corporations, the 
courts first decided what was important to protect against state power. In 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward . .. the United States Supreme 
Court gave its response to this question, an answer that came straight from 
Locke: what needed protection was property. 255 
In Dartmouth College, as in so many cases since, it appears that the 
courts are too quick to resolve a group protection right into an individual 
property right. 
The second reason for this recognition is that we are convinced that 
our legal system is individualistic. We have failed to develop a language 
adequate to deal with the position that the group actually occupies. 
Because we believe that the American tradition is one of individualism, 
we have all begun to speak in a language that seeks to make it so.256 
These two tendencies-to speak mistakenly in the language of 
individualism and to look askance at the importance of property rights-
are not confined to academic commentaries. The Supreme Court has 
exaggerated the importance of individual rights in its decisions and from 
time to time has shown itself unaware of the power that the property-
wielding corporation has enjoyed in American law. 
Perhaps the most famous misstatement of the nature of American 
rights comes from the case that established the one-man, one-vote rule. 
In Reynolds v. Sims"' the Court announced, "Legislators represent 
people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or 
cities or economic interests.""' To contend that this is true, and to 
suggest that it has always been the case, 259 is to ignore that at the time the 
255. Frug, supra note 236, at 1102 (citation omitted). 
256. This tendency to speak in terms of individual rights, while protecting group 
rights, leads to the question of whether-even if the corporation does deserve 
extraordinary protection under the law-it deserves to be protected as a "person." 
Garvey writes of the confusion that attaches to the use of this word: 
I learned in grade school that the plural of "person" was "people." I 
learned in law school that it was "persons." Initially I wrote this off as loose 
talk-natural enough coming from people who routinely mispronounced Latin 
and French nouns. It gradually dawned on me that not all the characters in law 
books were people. Some were corporations, unincorporated associations, 
trusts, cities, and churches. And the only way of talking collectively about 
them was to use that peculiar locution "persons." 
GARVEY, supra note 15, at 123. 
257. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
258. Id. at 562. 
259. See id. at 564 n.41 (quoting James Wilson, delegate to the Constitutional 
Convention, for the belief that "elections ought to be equal," and that they were equal 
"when a given number of citizens, in one part of the state, choose as many 
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nation was founded, the typical solution to the problem of representation 
was to compromise between equal representation and representation 
weighted to reflect interests. "0 It is also to forget that one of the 
purposes of the bicameral legislature was to represent the interests of 
propertied people out of proportion to their numbers. Thus Daniel 
Webster, speaking in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 
1820, insisted that property ought to remain the basis of representation 
in the Senate."' Webster, who argued and won the Dartmouth College 
case, believed that because men of property supported education, 
government, and religion, they should be protected in their possession."' 
In short, representatives have often represented people who owned 
acres and trees, and organizations, rather than individuals as such. It 
might be objected that the Reynolds Court was merely calling for an end 
to a long tradition of representation of property rights, but that is not 
exactly what it did. It pretended a continuity between the present and 
the past on the issue; in fact, in addition to trotting out James Wilson, the 
Court quoted Yick Wo v. Hopkins263 for the proposition that "the political 
franchise of voting" is "a fundamental political right, because 
preservative of all rights."264 
Yick Wo, of course, had much more to do with property rights than 
voting rights. It is no coincidence that the Anglo-American tradition has 
long hallowed property as the preservative of all rights. Yet, even as 
Americans vaunt the property right, there seems to be little conviction as 
to the reason that property is believed to be fundamental. 265 Seen in this 
light, the Court's loose use of history and its tendency to gravitate 
toward dicta may well indicate a failure to come to terms with certain 
essential features of American law. In fact, even in Reynolds the Court 
was unable to explain the nature of the right that it was protecting, for 
the Reynolds rule has more to do with group rights than with individual 
. h 266 ng ts. 
representatives, as are chosen by the same number of citizens, in any other part of the 
state"). 
260. See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text. 
26 I. See I THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: SPEECHES AND FORMAL WRITINGS, 
1800-1833, at 61-81 (Charles M. Wiltse ed., 1986). 
262. See id. at 73-76. "I cannot, therefore, sir, agree that it is in favor of society, or 
in favor of the people, to constitute government, with an entire disregard to those who 
bear the public burdens, in times of great exigency." Id. at 73. 
263. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
264. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 (quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370). 
265. See Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
329, 333 (I 996) ("There are many reasons why one might say that property is an 
important right. But why would anyone say that property is the keystone right, the 
central right on which all others rest?"). 
266. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding 
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This emphasis on the importance of groups is greater still when the 
Court is dealing with groups that have property, although this fact too is 
often overlooked. There is a tradition of mistakes-whether accidental 
or not-that has led us to recharacterize a group property right as an 
individual right of some other, "purer" kind. The most famous recent 
expression of this tendency to divorce the substantive claim from the 
property interest of the group asserting it came in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources v. Smith. 261 The Court in this case 
denied the Free Exercise claim made by two Native Americans who 
were dismissed from their jobs because of their ritual use of peyote, a 
use that was in accord with the ceremonies of the Native American 
Church.268 They were subsequently denied unemployment benefits, a 
denial which they contested on Free Exercise grounds.269 Justice Scalia 
explained in his majority opinion that such claims were never upheld on 
Free Exercise grounds alone, but only when accompanied by another 
claim."0 He went on to list a number of cases presenting such hybrid 
in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2292 (1998). Issacharoff and Karlan 
maintain that voting rights are primarily defined in terms of groups: 
The Court's difficulties in talking about race are exacerbated by its 
confusion regarding the nature of voting and reapportionment. If "[a]t the 
heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple 
command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals," then 
redistricting stabs at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment every time. Every 
reapportionment involves treating voters as members of a few, crudely defined 
groups rather than treating them as individuals with unique constellations of 
attributes and concerns. Voting does have several profoundly individualistic 
dimensions, which arise from the way in which it recognizes the voter as a 
full-fledged member of the community capable of participating actively in self-
governance, but redistricting is not one of them. Reapportionment is almost 
entirely about the collective, aggregative aspects of the political process. 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,911 (1995) (quoting 
Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting))). 
"We have argued elsewhere that even Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and its 
progeny should be viewed as cases about group political power and majoritarian control 
rather than purely about individual rights." Issacharoff & Karlan, supra, at 2282 n.30 
( citing Lani Guinier & Pamela S. Karlan, The Majoritarian Difficulty: One Person, One 
Vote, in REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN'S ENDURING INFLUENCE 207, 211-13 
(E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights 
To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1717-18 (1993)). 
267. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
268. See id. at 874. 
269. See id. 
270. The Court provided: 
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars 
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated 
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise 
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claims but failed to note that the distinguishing feature in these cases 
was generally the presence of a corporation (or other associative entity) 
making a property claim. 
One of the cases identified by Justice Scalia as a First Amendment 
case is Pierce v. Society of Sisters,"' which is well-known for 
vindicating a Catholic Free Exercise claim made against an Oregon 
statute requiring that children be educated in public schools."' Yet the 
case does not deserve its reputation. It was decided not on free exercise 
grounds, but on the basis of substantive due process."' The outcome had 
much more to do with the fact that the case was brought by a corporation 
that claimed invasion of a property right than with the protection of free 
exercise guaranteed by the Constitution. That is to say, without the 
"Society" and the school that it owned, the "Sisters" would have been in 
a much more precarious position. The majority opinion begins by 
recognizing that the Society of Sisters is an Oregon corporation that has 
dedicated property to the enterprise of Catholic education.274 Later it 
asserts that the corporate appellees "are threatened with destruction 
through the unwarranted compulsion which appellants are exercising 
over present and prospective patrons of their schools," and declares that 
"this [C]ourt has gone very far to protect against loss threatened by such 
action."275 
Commentators do not often recognize the role that property actually 
played in the disposition of the case.276 Nor do they frequently observe 
Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of 
speech and of the press, or the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, to direct the education of their children. 
Id. at 881 ( citations omitted). 
271. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
272. In characterizing Pierce this way, Justice Scalia echoed Justice Douglas in 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), who cited Pierce and Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390 (1923), as cases decided under the First Amendment: "The association of 
people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights. The right to 
educate a child in a school of the parents' choice-whether public or private or 
parochial-is also not mentioned .... Yet the First Amendment has been construed to 
include certain of those rights." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482. 
Justice Black objected to this explanation of the two cases, arguing in dissent that "the 
reasoning stated in Meyer and Pierce was the same natural law due process philosophy 
which many later opinions repudiated, and which I cannot accept." Id. at 516 (Black, J., 
dissenting). He pointed out that in Pierce the Court ruled "that a state law requiring that 
all children attend public schools interfered unconstitutionally with the property rights of 
private school corporations because it was an 'arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful 
interference' which threatened 'destruction of their business and property."' Id. (Black, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 536). 
273. John Attanasio suggested this point. 
274. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531-32. 
275. Id. at 535. 
276. For a very good article that examines the property issues in the case, see 
generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child? Meyer and Pierce and the 
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that there was another appellee in the case, the Hill Military Academy, 
which was also an Oregon corporation.277 The Military Academy, 
presumably, dedicated its property to a different kind of education but 
benefited from the same ruling as the Sisters. Pierce is one of the cases 
cited by Justice Scalia as a hybrid because it vindicated a claim that 
parents have a right to educate their children as well as a free exercise 
claim."' Does Pierce not also suggest that it is better to present a free 
exercise claim as a corporation with a property interest at stake? 
The legal system has also managed to accommodate the demands of 
other moral personalities even though they do not take true corporate 
form. In another of the cases cited by Justice Scalia, Wisconsin v. 
Yoder,219 two kinds of quasi-corporations came under attack by the State 
of Wisconsin: the family and the Amish people, considered as both a 
religious and social unit. This case leaves little doubt that the Court was 
doing something other than protecting an individual's right to exercise 
religion freely, for the majority opinion announced its views on 
corporatism, nature, and society. 280 
In deciding whether Amish children should be exempt from a 
requirement of compulsory attendance at public schools in Wisconsin, 
the majority opinion considered it very important that the Amish religion 
was an old one that had preserved essential social values. 281 The Amish 
were older than America itself. The Amish family deserved further 
consideration as a "natural" social unit because, though separate from 
American society, it was self-sufficient.'" Far from being anti-social, 
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARYL. REv. 995 (1992). 
Id. 
277. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 532-33. The Court stated: 
Appellee, Hill Military Academy, is a private corporation organized in 
1908 under the laws of Oregon, engaged in owning, operating and conducting 
for profit an elementary, college preparatory and military training school for 
boys between the ages of five and twenty-one years .... It owns considerable 
real and personal property, some useful only for school purposes. The 
business and incident good will are very valuable. 
278. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 
(1990). 
279. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
280. See Katz, supra note 13, at 20 (recognizing Yoder for the group protection it 
affords and contending that the Court has since retreated from the protection of groups). 
281. "We must not forget that in the Middle Ages important values of the 
civilization of the Western World were preserved by members of religious orders who 
isolated themselves from all worldly influences against great obstacles." Yoder, 406 
U.S. at 223. 
282. The Court declared: 
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the Amish ethic was highly compatible with the concerns of other 
Americans. 283 
Most strikingly, the Amish "communities" created a dependable 
individual who would have found favor with the Founders themselves: 
When Thomas Jefferson emphasized the need for education as a bulwark of a 
free people against tyranny, there is nothing to indicate he had in mind 
compulsory education through any fixed age beyond a basic education. Indeed, 
the Amish communities singularly parallel and reflect many of the virtues of 
Jefferson's ideal of the "sturdy yeoman" who would form the basis of what he 
considered as the ideal of a democratic society.284 
The Amish had earned a privilege on the basis of their corporate claim 
to be anterior to the State, 285 as well as on the basis of their ability to tum 
out the kind of individual who had created the United States. Here we 
see that the protection of the individual and that of the group are not so 
far apart as we might think, and the Court inadvertently summed up 
much of its thinking on corporate rights when it observed that "[t]he 
child is not the mere creature of the State. "286 
Even more clearly than in Pierce, the claim in Yoder was vindicated 
because it was brought on behalf of communities whose existence went 
back beyond the United States. Additionally, the communities 
possessed the American virtue of a capacity for hard work and 
demonstrated their "sociability" via their commercial activities. The 
Court made it clear that similar exemptions would not be available to 
individuals who simply rejected "the contemporary secular values 
accepted by the majority,""' and that "the very concept of ordered 
liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on 
The Amish alternative to formal secondary school education has enabled them 
to function effectively in their day-to-day life under self-imposed limitations 
on relations with the world, and to survive and prosper in contemporary 
society as a separate, sharply identifiable and highly self-sufficient community 
for more than 200 years in this country. 
Id. at 225. 
283. 'There is nothing in this record to suggest that the Amish qualities of 
reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to work would fail to find ready markets in 
today's society." Id. at 224. 
284. Id. at 225-26. 
285. According to the Court: 
Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a 
long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society, 
the Amish in this case have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their 
religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital 
role that belief and daily conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order 
Amish communities and their religious organization, and the hazards presented 
by the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others. 
Id. at 235 (emphasis added). 
286. Id. at 233 (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 5IO, 535 (1925)). 
287. Id. at 216. 
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matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important 
interests.""' Further, the Court was satisfied that the desire of the Amish 
to be exempted from a public education requirement was "not merely a 
matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, 
shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living."289 
Like the Society of Sisters, the Amish were members of an ancient and 
organized religion that demonstrated its sociability and self-sufficiency 
in a way of life that blended both morality and economy. 
What is the difference between the situation presented in Pierce and 
Yoder, and of that in Smith? It cannot be explained by a simple 
reference to a hybrid right, without further reference to the character of 
that right. In Pierce and Yoder the plaintiffs were societies that 
dedicated their own property to maintaining a way of life-a way of life 
separate from but compatible with American ways. By contrast, the 
plaintiffs in Smith represented corporate interests of a kind long believed 
to be incompatible with the "American" way of life and long 
marginalized, largely because the Indian tribes have been perceived to 
hold their property communally rather than privately.29° Further, the 
property at issue in Smith, state unemployment benefits, belonged in the 
first instance to the government rather than to the plaintiffs. 
This point, implicit in Smith, is made much more clearly in Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Ass'n,291 another case involving a 
Free Exercise claim made on behalf of tribes."' Here the Court 
determined that the United States could build a road through land that 
was held sacred by a number of tribes without violating their Free 
Exercise rights."' The opinion comes down to the bare fact that the 
Indians could not claim a Free Exercise violation because they did not 
own the lands in question."' As Justice O'Connor put it, "Whatever 
288. Id. at 215-16. 
289. Id. at 216 ( emphasis added). 
290. For a systematic account of the centuries-old story of the desire of English 
colonists, and then Anglo-Americans, to transform (i.e., destroy) Indian society via the 
introduction of private property, see generally Liam Seamus O'Melinn, The Imperial 
Origins of Federal Indian Law: The Ideology of Coloniwtion in Britain, Ireland, and 
America, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1207 (1999). 
291. 485 U.S. 439 (I 988). 
292. This is one of the cases presented by Soifer to demonstrate that the legal 
system has not adequately recognized the group personality of the Indian tribes. See 
SOIFER, supra note 7, at 84-85. 
293. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451-53. 
294. See id. at 453. 
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rights the Indians may have to the use of the area ... do not divest the 
Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land."29' She might 
well have gone on, had the history of church incorporation suggested 
itself to her, to note that American law had formed a longstanding habit 
of vindicating religious claims most enthusiastically when those claims 
were made within familiar bounds of property law. 
As Pierce and Yoder make clear, the exemptions claimed in both 
Smith and Lyng are generally reserved for societies that are both 
independent, in the sense of being self-sufficient, and compatible with 
American society, in the sense that they have a product to exchange with 
the broader society. They are not extended in the fullest sense to 
societies whose ways seem to the courts to be fundamentally 
incompatible with the rules of American civil society, or to individuals. 
Although the language of the law often makes it seem that the strongest 
claim is that of the property-holding individual, these cases argue that it 
is the property-holding society that receives the greatest favor. Indeed, 
given the church cases, it becomes obvious that even though the interest 
that is being defended is stated in terms of property rights held by 
individuals, what is really being defended is a way of life of a group.296 
C. Sovereign Endorsement and Involuntary Association 
If it is incorrect, then, to argue that the legal system is preoccupied 
with the rights of the individual at the expense of the group, what is the 
source of the charge of individualism that is made by so many critics? 
There are two closely-related sources: a reluctance on the part of the 
government to endorse the chosen activities of groups, and a similar 
hesitancy to group people against their will. By the same token, as the 
religion cases suggest, when groups are identified as voluntary in their 
composition and have dedicated property to their chosen pursuits, then 
they may well qualify for special favor from the government. In fact, 
the relevance of the religion cases becomes much clearer as we see that 
in some respects the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment are adjudicated in a similar fashion to the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Two 
cases known for their individualism help to make these points: Regents 
295. Id. 
296. Garvey urges us to recognize that in cases involving property, the Court often 
protects the right of the group rather than the individual: 
Look now at a very different kind of explanation for the Court's behavior 
in this area. It is this: the freedom that the law seeks to protect is not the 
freedom of individual church members but the freedom of churches as groups. 
The group is a legal and moral person distinct from its members .... 
GARVEY, supra note 15, at 146-47. 
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of the University v. Bakke'" and Shaw v. Reno."' 
Bakke is another case that is widely misunderstood solely as an 
instance of the preoccupation of American law with the rights of the 
individual. Yet it is a case in which the Court highlighted the odd way 
that the conflicting claims of government, social groups, and individuals 
were to be mediated according to the demands of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
To begin with, Bakke shows hostility not to groups as such, or to 
claims made on behalf of groups, but to attempts by the government to 
assign people to groups-to operate on the basis of what equal 
protection analysis usually refers to as a "suspect classification." Critics 
have noted Bakke's insistence that government owed protection to the 
individual, but have not paid enough attention to the mode of analysis, 
which focuses more on the anti-grouping principle than on the 
individual.299 The Constitution, wrote Justice Powell, did not allow the 
government to create groups based on "color, ethnic origin, or condition 
of prior servitude."300 To do so would be to impose a divide in an 
arbitrary fashion, distorting social fact with governmental fiction.'01 
Shaw makes the point in a different way, emphasizing the connection 
between sovereign endorsement and involuntary grouping. Consider the 
most important passage in the case: 
A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to 
the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and 
political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but 
the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political 
apartheid. It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group-
regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which 
they live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the 
same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as 
impermissible racial stereotypes.302 
This line of thought, to which the Court is adhering quite strictly, 
297. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
298. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
299. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289. "It is settled beyond question that the 'rights 
created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to 
the individual. The rights established are personal rights."' Id. at 289 (quoting Shelley 
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I, 22 (1948)). 
300. Id. at 293. 
301. See id. at 295. "[T]he white 'majority' itself is composed of various minority 
groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of 
the State and private individuals." Id. 
302. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993). 
159 
amounts to a prohibition of government endorsements of "such 
perceptions." 
The Court is forbidding endorsements by the government that imply 
people share the same interests because they are of the same race. Thus, 
Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi have come much nearer the mark in 
explaining Shaw than have other scholars; in their view, Shaw signifies a 
concern on the part of the Court for "[e]xpressive harms" that is "in 
general, social rather than individual."303 These expressive harms are 
notable not for the injuries they inflict on individuals but for "the way in 
which they undermine collective understandings."'04 
It would still be more accurate to say that Shaw is concerned with 
preventing expressive harms through which the government assigns 
people to groups on the basis of race. Justice O'Connor is concerned 
with de jure social harms alone. This echoes the constraint that Bakke 
places upon the government, on the theory that endorsement is harmful 
because it creates a class on the basis of race. 
In this respect Shaw is merely the flip side of the American rule on 
group-protection. The law will recognize groups that are clearly the 
result of voluntary association and will even favor them, but it will not 
create them itself. The body of jurisprudence that results is suspiciously 
similar to concerns over endorsement found in First Amendment law. 
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that this similarity derives not from an 
American tradition of individualism, but from one of corporatism. 
Indeed, this devotion to corporatism is evident in another feature of 
the Bakke opinion that is not observed by many commentators: the 
nature of its defense of diversity. In addition to stating the anti-grouping 
principle as a prohibition imposed on the government, the case 
represents an extraordinary statement on the ability of groups to 
prescribe and follow their own agendas. Whereas government action 
undertaken on the basis of racial classification is suspect, a university's 
right to determine its own mission and to set appropriate standards of 
admission can allow some consideration of race. In effect, Justice 
Powell alerted the University of California that insofar as it behaves as a 
private institution in the business of providing education, it can forget 
that it is also an arm of the government. A "diverse student body," 
wrote Justice Powell, is "clearly ... a constitutionally permissible goal 
for an institution of higher education."'0' What government could not do 
according to the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, universities-
303. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Hanns, "Bimrre 
Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances after Shaw v. 
Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483,507 (1993). 
304. Id. 
305. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12. 
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corporations of academics-could do in the name of the academic 
freedom guaranteed them by the First Amendment.")6 They were, in 
other words, free to define their own purposes, even when the 
government might not avail itself of the same means. 
The resulting jurisprudence establishes an academic freedom-a First 
Amendment freedom-that can be exercised only by a privileged group. 
In appreciating the character of this freedom, it is essential to observe 
that the privilege does not belong to those who would be the immediate 
beneficiaries of diversity-based admissions, i.e., applicants drawn from 
minority groups. It belongs to the people who set the university's 
agenda, the corporators, and it can only be exercised by people who are 
actually in a position to receive enough applications to make selection of 
a diverse student body possible to begin with. 
Thus, the Bakke rule on diversity can be stated as a property right, 
particularly if property is understood in terms of propriety. As scholars 
such as Carol Rose and Gregory Alexander have argued, there is a 
distinction between property considered "as an engine for the 
maximization of preference satisfactions" and "property as propriety, as 
the foundation of decency and good order."307 In this case the University 
is told that it can act within its own sphere, to engage in such acts as are 
appropriate to its mission and such as are necessary to order its affairs. 
It is also told that it cannot go beyond its own bounds, for instance, to 
take care of business that more properly belongs to the federal or state 
government. This is a property claim based on the propriety of the 
chosen means considered in relation to a corporate purpose. The tacit 
message of the Court is that the University gets to make its own rules, 
even though some of them might be impermissible when employed by a 
government actor.'0' 
It may seem anomalous that an equal protection argument on behalf of 
diversity should fail while a similar First Amendment claim should 
306. See id. 
307. ROSE, supra note 236, at 64. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 236, at 
194-203. 
308. This rule, that an entity may not go beyond its own proper bounds in racial 
matters, is repeated in a long line of cases, and notably in City of Richmond v. Croson, 
488 U.S. 469 (1989), in which the Court ruled that while Richmond might adopt race-
conscious means to remedy either discrimination in which the city itself had engaged, or 
discrimination occuning within its bounds, it had no authority to adopt such means to 
remedy discrimination that had occurred outside its borders: "Nothing we say today 
precludes a state or local entity from taking action to rectify the effects of identified 
discrimination within its jurisdiction." Id. at 509. 
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succeed, but this strange conversion is a testament to the hold that the 
corporation has on the American legal mind. Nor is this kind of thinking 
restricted to Bakke and Shaw; there are other cases suggesting 
convergence between religion and equal protection cases. Justice 
O'Connor's reasoning in Shaw is quite similar to the reasoning in her 
concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly,"" in which she expressed the Lemon310 
establishment test simply in terms of endorsement.'11 Moreover, Justice 
Kennedy's concurrence in Board of Education v. Grumet,'1' which reads 
as if it addressed the same issue as Shaw, noted a close similarity 
between equal protection and First Amendment analysis. Government, 
he wrote, 
may not use religion as a criterion to draw political or electoral lines. Whether 
or not the purpose is accommodation and whether or not the government 
provides similar gerrymanders to people of all religious faiths, the 
Establishment Clause forbids the government to use religion as a line-drawing 
criterion. In this respect, the Establishment Clause mirrors the Equal Protection 
Clause. Just as the government may not segregate people on account of their 
race, so too it may not segregate people on the basis of religion. 313 
In attempting to understand this seeming confusion of legal categories 
more fully, it is tempting to wonder what the Court is worried about. In 
the area of race-conscious redistricting, that is a difficult question to 
answer if we think in terms of the individual. As critics of Shaw have 
pointed out, it is difficult to see what the injury to any individual 
plaintiff actually was."• 
309. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
310. The Lemon test has emerged from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
311. Thus, although she would have applied a two-prong test, each prong concerned 
itself exclusively with the issue of endorsement. Justice O'Connor insisted that the 
"central issue in this case is whether [the City] has endorsed Christianity by its display of 
the creche. To answer that question, we must examine both what [the City] intended to 
communicate in displaying the creche and what message the City's display actually 
conveyed." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690. 
312. 512 U.S. 687 (1994). 
313. Id. at 728. This Article does not mean to assert here that there is a simple 
congruence between the two lines of analysis, so as to suggest either that a majority of 
the Court treats establishment and equal protection the same way, or that adoption of the 
endorsement test forecasts the way an individual Justice will vote in a particular case. 
Thus, although it is noted that Abner Greene and Ira Lupu have debated this issue, this 
Article does not attempt to decide that debate. See Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and 
Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 Cot.UM. L. REv. 1, 27-51 (1996) (arguing for a 
connection between race and religion); Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the Village of Kiryas 
Joel, 96 Cot.UM. L. REV. 104, 113-20 (1996) (arguing against the connection). 
However, this Article does intend to point out that sensitivity to language regarding 
voluntary and involuntary grouping, rather than to language regarding individual rights, 
argues that there is some connection between race and religion in the minds of some of 
the members of the Court. 
314. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 266, at 2288 ("The preceding discussion 
suggests two things. First, a coherent concept of standing grows out of a clear definition 
162 
[VOL. 37: IOI, 2000] Corporation in American Law 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
In this setting, the injury is better understood in terms of a 
commitment to honoring the group that is voluntarily assembled and that 
has come to court to vindicate the use of its property. It must also be 
understood in terms of a tradition holding that the government takes its 
instructions from its corporate constituents. Considered in this light, the 
injury would appear to be found in a departure from a traditional 
American rule regarding sovereign authorship--the endorsement is the 
departure and this departure inflicts harm per se. 
The comparison with France helps to make this point clearer. The 
Court's fear is that the government will wind up like the author of 
Rousseau's plays, as a sovereign author that shapes its constituents and 
constituencies to its will.'1' To Rousseau's central question-"Will they 
form us or will we form them?"' 16-the Court's answer is that they (the 
constituents) will form us (the government). In giving this answer the 
Court has remained consistent with its decision in Pierce. Oregon had 
defended its attack on private schools as an effort to remold its 
constituents in order to produce a uniform citizenry that integrated the 
diverse elements of American society in one body politic.' 1' The brief 
for the Society of Sisters quoted an official pamphlet explaining 
Oregon's law in terms of such integration: "Mix the children of the 
foreign-born with the native-born, the rich with the poor. Mix those 
with prejudices in the public school melting pot for a few years while 
their minds are plastic, and finally bring out the finished product-a true 
American.""' 
By rejecting this argument, the Court appears to have accepted the 
Society of Sisters' claim that Oregon's plan bore a "ruthless and even 
cruel implication which is subversive of American ideals of home and 
parental authority. If the children, against the will of their parents, are to 
be 'mixed' by legislative mandate, it is difficult to perceive where this 
sort of legislation will end."' 1' Moreover, as Barbara Woodhouse notes, 
the Oregon measure was understood not merely as an intrusion on the 
of the relevant injury. Second, the Supreme Court has failed to articulate any theory of 
injury that coherently accounts for the standing rule it has produced."). 
315. See supra Part II.B. 
316. ROUSSEAU, supra note 70, at 119 (emphasis added). 
317. See Brief on Behalf of Appellee, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925) (No. 583), in 23 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 259, 306-07 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard 
Casper eds., 1975). 
318. Id. at 307. 
319. Id. 
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family but on the rights of the institutions that formed the basis of 
American society as well."0 It was 
an assault on a certain way of life. As the brief for Society of Sisters pointed 
out: "If the state can thus destroy the primary school, it can destroy the 
secondary school, the college and the university. Harvard, Yale, Columbia, 
Princeton . . . [a]ll could be swept away, and with them would depart an 
influence and an inspiration that this country can ill afford to lose."321 
In choosing between the right of the State to shape its constituents in 
order to integrate them, and the right of the private institution to live 
according to its own ways, the Court, then as now, endorsed the rights of 
the constituent over those of the sovereign author. 
VIL CONCLUSION 
As this Article's analysis suggests, critics of the Court have reason to 
complain. Is it appropriate to treat people without either property or 
privilege as if they had both? Is it sensible to treat race-redistricting 
cases-in which minority group members are seeking greater inclusion 
in the political order-in the same fashion as free exercise and 
establishment cases-in which group members are seeking exemption 
from some requirement of the political order? The traditional answers to 
these questions are, at the very least, problematic. And that is precisely 
the reason why many critics of American law look to Rousseau as a 
guide. His insistence that the truest body politic was an indivisible 
people is certainly compatible with the desire to achieve complete 
inclusion in the people of the United States. 
Yet Rousseau is not available to us. The direct and absolute 
relationship between the individual and the sovereign state, on which his 
republicanism was premised, is foreign to American republicanism. The 
American people have been divided and subdivided so many times that 
their true nature seems to lie in di vision rather than in unity. It is thus 
difficult to speak of the American people as if it were one body. In 
addition, however desirable sovereign authorship may be, the theory that 
underlies it has never really taken root in the United States and is 
unlikely to do so in the near future. The government is not in the habit 
of assembling groups; it is in the habit of receiving instructions from 
them. The tragedy is not that American law has too little room for 
groups, but that it has too much room for the group that has come 
together of its own volition and put property to certain uses. 
The challenge is not to teach the Court how to speak the language of 
320. See Woodhouse, supra note 276, at I 104-05. 
321. Id. ( quoting Brief on Behalf of Appellee, supra note 3 I 7, at 355-56). 
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Rousseau-although that would be a trick-but to find a tenable way to 
vindicate the claims of groups that diverge in important ways from those 
traditionally honored by American law. In seeking to protect groups that 
have historically been underprivileged, the challenge is to find new ways 
to demonstrate that interests are voluntarily shared and affiliations 
voluntarily entered into. 
When faced with the individual who neither belongs to an approved 
group nor has property to devote to a cause, American law has long 
given the same answer: Go and associate with others so as to become a 
bigger person, a corporate person. This answer, which has proved 
satisfactory in areas such as religion, has proved less so in others. It is 
not an adequate answer, and we will never find one as long as we insist 
that the problem with American law is that it pays too much attention to 
the rights of the individual. 
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